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Abstract
This paper discusses Victor D. Cha’s “Powerplay Theory” to explain China’s strategy to secure influence within ASEAN through asymmetric bilateral relations, focusing on Cambodia and Laos. Originally conceptualized by Cha to describe the origins of the American alliance system in Asia, Powerplay seeks to explain how a great power seeks maximum control over smaller states to exert leverage and influence, keeping them close enough to prevent potential hostility from these states. At the same time, the relationship also tends to come at the cost of – or at least bypasses – multilateral mechanisms that could dilute its more direct influence. I argue that such exercise is evident in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which fosters economic dependency and grants Beijing significant leverage over the foreign policies of “smaller states.” Cambodia, deeply reliant on Chinese investments and aid, frequently aligns its actions with Beijing, obstructing ASEAN’s initiatives on the South China Sea, including efforts toward the Code of Conduct. Similarly, Laos, burdened by debt from Chinese-funded infrastructure projects like the Vientiane-Boten Railway, faces increasing limitations in countering China’s policies. At the same time, China’s bilateral approach has weakened ASEAN’s unity by disrupting consensus decision-making, as member states prioritize Beijing’s interests. By cultivating economic dependence, China ensures the protection of its regional ambitions, particularly its extensive territorial claims in the South China Sea. While this strategy has bolstered Beijing’s position, it has simultaneously exposed Cambodia and Laos to considerable risks stemming from over-reliance. To avoid further disunity and decline in ASEAN’s relevance, as well as ensure its primacy as the main regional mechanism, this article argues that the idealn path forward is for ASEAN states to embark on diversifying their economic partnerships.