

# **Great Power Relations in the Pacific: Their Impact on US-Indonesian Relations**

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Without any rigorous attempts at a precise definition of what constitutes a great power, this essay will assume that the great powers in the Pacific comprise the two superpowers, namely, the United States and the Soviet Union, plus China and Japan. Relations among these four great powers are of complex nature. Bilateral relations between any two of them cannot possibly be separated from their quadrangular interaction.

It may be presumed that to the extent that they have an impact on US-Indonesian relations, these sets of great power bilateral relations are not likely to be of equal strength and importance. Relations between the two superpowers, which have virtually dominated international politics over the past four decades, will have the most dominant, powerful, and lasting influence.

Indeed, the growth of the Sino-Soviet dispute over at least the last two decades have given rise to a new alignment in the quadrangular relations among the four great powers in the Pacific. But even these quadrangular relations have been shaped in the main by the overriding superpower relations. With the Soviet Union maintaining an adversary relationship with each of the other three powers, great power relations in the region have also been more or less bipolarised between the Soviet Union on the one hand and a crude, loose, and informal form of de facto alliance association among the United States, China, and Japan on the other.

This essay will therefore review, first of all, relations between the two superpowers. Then it will discuss the China factor, since the new great power

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alignment in the Pacific has grown primarily out of the Sino-Soviet dispute. In the process an assessment of the possible impact of these two main themes on US-Indonesian relations will be made. However, perhaps being a close ally of the United States and a close friend of Indonesia, Japan's relations with each of the other three great powers will have the least noticeable impact on US-Indonesian relations. At all events in what follows, these will be left out so as to minimise the complexity of the discussion.

## SUPERPOWER RELATIONS

The unfolding of the Cold War after the end of World War II coincided with the period of Indonesia's ongoing struggle for national independence against Dutch colonialism. Thus from the very beginning the Cold War which has basically continued to mark the relations between the superpowers up to the present day, had affected Indonesia's outlook and orientation in foreign policy and in a sense its attitude towards the United States. With some variation this has been the general pattern up to now.

The formulation of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy, to which successive Indonesian governments from then on have committed themselves, was originally precipitated by pressure from the communists to have the new Republic of Indonesia allied with the Soviet Union in the emerging antagonism between the two great powers.<sup>1</sup> But Indonesia's refusal to ally itself with either the Soviet Union or the United States had something to do, at least in part, with Indonesia's disillusionment with the United States.<sup>2</sup> This disillusionment was the result of a conflict between Indonesia's expectations of US role and US interests.

Well before Indonesia's independence, leaders of the Indonesian nationalist movement, notably Sutan Sjahrir, one of the most prominent, had expected that the arrival of the Allied, particularly US forces would assist Indonesia in achieving independence.<sup>3</sup> Such expectations must have been based on their belief in US anti-colonial tradition.

However, in spite of the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations, and despite the repeated pronouncements of US leaders throughout

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<sup>1</sup>See Mohammad Hatta, *Mendajung Antara Dua Karang* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1976).

<sup>2</sup>George McTurnan Kahin, "Indonesia," in *Major Governments of Asia*, 2nd ed., edited by *idem* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 680.

<sup>3</sup>George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 113.

the war years, US commitment to the principle of self-determination remained rhetorical. It was never translated into a meaningful policy, particularly with regard to Southeast Asia.<sup>4</sup> Thus for consideration of its own, the US continued to side with the Netherlands in the first four years of Indonesia's national revolution in the belief that otherwise the programme for the rehabilitation and re-integration of Western Europe to present a solid front against the Soviet Union would be endangered.

When the US did finally side with Indonesia, especially in the light of its proven ability, unaided, to put down a communist rebellion, the overriding concern of the US in changing its policy in favour of Indonesia was "the development of an effective counter-force to communism in the Far East leading eventually to the emergence of SEA as an integral part of the free world, ..."<sup>5</sup> US global interest continued to be the primary motive for its policy toward Indonesia, be it in the form of "neutrality," which in effect favoured the Dutch position, or a complete about-face to side with Indonesia.

Once Indonesia obtained international recognition of its existence as a sovereign and independent state, its continued commitment to an independent and active foreign policy notwithstanding, it began to pursue what was virtually a pro-West foreign policy, while internally it maintained a liberal Western type of democracy.<sup>6</sup> This development could not but be due, in very large measure, to the role of the US in the final settlement of Indonesia's dispute with the Netherlands in favour of Indonesia's independence. It was also related to the generally negative sentiment in Indonesia toward the Soviet Union, which, it was felt, had masterminded the communist revolt (the Madiun Affair) in 1948 and which had assumed a hostile attitude toward the new republic.

In spite of such developments, however, the US past experience of "neutrality" in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict was repeated in the ensuing years when the conflict re-emerged on the issue of West Irian, the remaining part of Indonesia still occupied by the Dutch. On the face of it one would get the impression that the US had not learned its lesson. The fact, though, is that US global interest in containing Soviet communist power had become more entrenched now that its policy of containment had even been extended to the Far East as a result of the communist seizure of power in China and the outbreak of the Korean war. At the same time, now that Indonesia had achieved its in-

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<sup>4</sup>Robert J. McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-1949* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 305.

<sup>5</sup>NSC-51, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 312.

<sup>6</sup>See, e.g., Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 384-394; and Russell H. Fifield, *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper, 1959), pp. 108-166.

dependence, its conflict with the Dutch over West Irian was much less of a clear-cut issue of colonialism. It is thus understandable that the US again maintained a "neutral" position, which in the eyes of Indonesians could only mean siding with the Dutch for its support of the status quo.

The advent of the Eisenhower Administration only made matters worse for US-Indonesian relations with its harder line toward the Soviet Union, despite the President's role in bringing the Korean war to an end. This was -- in the memories of the non-aligned nations -- the notorious period of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who regarded the independent policy of the uncommitted new nations of Asia and Africa as immoral.

Indeed, despite the first visit ever paid to the US by an Indonesian President (Soekarno) in 1956, and the second in 1960, US-Indonesian relations during this period continued along a downward trend. The discovery of what looked like evidence of US involvement, if perhaps covert and unofficial, in the regional rebellion in 1958 was the nadir of relations between the two countries. This encouraged Indonesia's further drift toward the Soviet Union, which, for its own ends, exploited Indonesia's increasingly militant anti-Western (US) attitude and provided the latter with the wherewithal that it needed for its campaign to regain West Irian: continuous political and diplomatic support as well as various forms of economic and military assistance on a scale that rendered Indonesia's threat of force at least appear credible.

Indeed, President Soekarno seemed to have learned a better lesson than the Americans from Indonesia's revolutionary experience, which he applied effectively and successfully to the campaign over West Irian. There are indications that right from the outset he, in fact, had looked to US role in a settlement of the West Irian dispute in Indonesia's favour. He exploited to the full US overriding pre-occupation with the unity of the Western alliance against the communist menace all over the globe which, just as in Indonesia's revolutionary years, would eventually work to the advantage of Indonesia even if initially the same concern would appear to militate against such an outcome.

To be sure, the change in US administration into the hands of President Kennedy, well-known for his sympathy and better understanding of the aspirations of the new nations of the developing world, may have had a part in affecting the turn of events in Indonesia's favour. On the independent policy of the uncommitted nations he once expressed his view that "The desire to be independent and free carries with it the desire not to become engaged as a satellite of the Soviet Union or too closely allied to the United States. We have to live with that, and if neutrality is the result of concentration on internal prob-

lems, raising the standard of living of the people and so on, ... I would accept that."<sup>7</sup>

Indeed, compared with the previous policy of the Dulles period, such a view was quite revolutionary. Yet from the point of view of US global interest, such a transformation of attitude, when translated into policy, was no more than a change in approach. US strategic and basic foreign policy objective remained the same. In the words of one of former Kennedy advisers,

"... the third world had now become the critical battle-ground between democracy and communism and that the practical effect of Dulles's bell, book and candle against neutralism could only be to prejudice the American case and drive the developing nations toward Moscow and Peking. The battle for Europe, Kennedy believed, had been, except for Berlin, essentially won by the end of the forties. ...Where Dulles divided the world on the question of whether nations would sign up in a crusade against communism, thereby forcing the neutrals to the other side of the line, Kennedy, by making national independence the crucial question, invited the neutrals to find a common interest with us in *resisting communist expansion*."<sup>8</sup>

Indeed, it seems that although at the beginning of the 1960s the Sino-Soviet dispute had come increasingly into the open, the US government was yet to fully appreciate the extent and possible implications of the conflict and to exploit it to serve its own strategic interest. World communism was still regarded as essentially a monolithic movement under the leadership of Moscow. In the event of hostilities between Indonesia, supported by the Soviet Union, and the Netherlands, supported by the United States, wrote Robert Kennedy, the "Communists would become far more entrenched in Indonesia, the anti-Communists would have their position undermined, and Southeast Asia would have been encircled by the Soviet Union and China."<sup>9</sup>

Thus to a large extent President Soekarno's successful exploitation of his Soviet connection was made possible by the US perception -- or misperception -- of Soviet intentions. The continued Soviet diplomatic backing and Soekarno's "rattling a Soviet sabre"<sup>10</sup> led the US to believe that the Soviet Union was really prepared to be directly involved in a possible escalation of the conflict over West Irian. And in the event of Soviet involvement the US might well

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<sup>7</sup>Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Mefflin, 1965), p. 511.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 507-508; emphasis added.

<sup>9</sup>Robert F. Kennedy, *Just Friends and Brave Enemies* (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 6; emphasis added.

<sup>10</sup>Arnold C. Brackman, *Indonesian Communism: A History* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 284.

have been drawn into the conflict because of its commitment to a NATO ally. As Robert Kennedy noted:

“As the Communists saw it, if hostilities were begun by Indonesia, the West, including the United States, would end up on the side of the Dutch, opposing the military action of the Indonesians. The line-up would then be described as a struggle between the colonial nations supported by the United States, against the new nations of the world, supported by the Communists. This was a conflict which would be unpleasant at best and would, over an extended period of time, be virtually impossible for us to win ...”<sup>11</sup>

Arthur Schlesinger also noted that President Kennedy did not want “to let matters develop to the point of great power confrontation in the Banda Sea with Moscow and Peking backing Indonesia while America backed the Dutch.”<sup>12</sup> Indeed, given the concern on the part of both superpowers to avoid a possible escalation of the West Irian dispute into an East-West confrontation, the continued and full Soviet support for Indonesia’s claim and massive arms supplies to Indonesia ought presumably to have been assessed more in the light of Sino-Soviet competition in the Third World than in the context of Soviet antagonism with the West. They should have been so assessed especially in view of Chinese allegations about the lack of Soviet support for “national liberation movements.” To the benefit of Indonesia, however, the United States appears to have misread Soviet behaviour. “Sukarno knew he was negotiating from a position of strength,” Brackman remarked, “i.e. the weakness of the great powers in Southeast Asia.”<sup>13</sup>

The great power game in Southeast Asia was different, however, when President Soekarno attempted to apply the same tactics again in his policy of confrontation against the Malaysian federation. It seemed that the absence of US intervention in favour of Indonesia as in the case of the West Irian dispute can be attributed primarily to the absence of the Soviet factor. In fact, there was a hardening attitude on the part of the US under President Johnson toward Indonesia. This was signified by the signing of a joint communique between President Johnson and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman in Washington in July 1964. That was just shortly after the first expression of open Soviet support for Indonesia’s confrontation against Malaysia, which was given by Mr. Mikoyan at the end of his visit to Indonesia.

It may be argued that US policy had shifted in favour of Malaysia not on account, but in spite, of the open Soviet support for Indonesia’s confronta-

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<sup>11</sup>Kennedy, *Just Friends*, p. 6.

<sup>12</sup>Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 534.

<sup>13</sup>Brackman, *Southeast Asia’s Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 105.

tion. The opposite, indeed, had been true in the case of West Irian, when strong Soviet support for Indonesia had moved the US toward the Indonesian position. But in the case of the Malaysia confrontation Soviet support, when it was finally given, was too late, too little, and therefore of little value. The Sino-Soviet dispute had come into play.

In addition, Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia also coincided with the beginning of another period of detente between the superpowers in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis. Indeed, as in the West Irian dispute, the US was also concerned with the possibility that unless a peaceful settlement of the Malaysia conflict was found, Indonesia would be increasingly allied with the communist camp. But with the widening Sino-Soviet rift US policy of containment was now directed primarily against the danger of Chinese rather than Russian-inspired communist expansion.

Indeed, Indonesia was increasingly allied with China, the staunchest supporter of its confrontation policy against Malaysia. But without a corresponding position in its adversary relationship with the United States, China was no substitute for the Soviet Union to effectively play a "big-brother" role in Indonesia's policy of confrontation. Indonesia's game of playing one superpower off against the other was over. Neither the weight of the Soviet Union nor that of the United States was available any longer. And Indonesia's relations with both superpowers continued their downward trend.

In the end, Indonesia's close relationship with China resulted in the highest point of its experience of great power interference in the form of the "Gestapu" (Communist attempted Coup) affair and its aftermath, in which China was involved. But for Indonesia it was a blessing in disguise. It was an epoch-making event in that it marked the beginning of a rapid end of the old order and the onset of a new order with its own style and priorities in foreign policy.

From then on there ensued for more than a decade a period of changing great power relations in Southeast Asia. In spite of escalation in the Vietnam war, detente continued to develop between the superpowers. History noted the signing of the limited nuclear-test ban treaty in 1963, the non-proliferation treaty of 1968, SALT I and the ABM treaty in 1972, and finally the signing of SALT II in 1979.

In principle, detente did not put a stop to competition between the superpowers, and thus nations outside the superpower connection continued to be a battleground for such competition. And added to it, especially as far as Southeast Asia is concerned, has been Sino-Soviet rivalry. As far as Indonesia is con-

cerned, however, this was the period in which it was least exposed to external interference. Both China and the Soviet Union were to swallow their failures in exerting their influence.

By contrast, in spite of the Guam doctrine and the ensuing US withdrawal from the region, which for a time resulted in some degree of concern in Southeast Asia over a decrease, if not a loss, of US interest in the region, and in spite of the growth later on of US-Chinese rapprochement, it was a time for US-Indonesia relations to pick up. Both trends, however, were also related to internal developments in the region. The relative success of ASEAN has stood in good stead to its member countries in steering clear of possible external interference. It was a period in which, while the great powers were busily engaged in making adjustments in their triangular and quadrangular relationship, the ASEAN states could focus their greater attention on their internal and regional affairs.

Near the end of the last decade, however, the breakdown of detente between the superpowers, accompanied by mutual accusations and passing of the buck, created new international tension. It prepared the ground for the "Second World War" with the advent of the first Reagan administration, which, with its abrasive rhetorics, revived the cries of the "Soviet threat."

Indeed, the Soviet military buildup in the Pacific over the past decade and the increasing Soviet presence in Vietnam since the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea at the end of 1978 have helped to give such cries some degree of cogency. And for a time the sudden, if brief, deterioration in Soviet-Indonesian relations related to the expulsion of Soviet officials on spy charges early in this decade, although relations between the two countries had not been particularly warm and close since the previous decade, may have given the impression that Indonesia was adjusting itself to the hardline policy of the Reagan administration.

Soon, however, for reasons of its own, Indonesia made fresh attempts to improve relations with the Soviet Union and other communist countries, which have continued until today. The fact that those attempts caused some questioning in the West<sup>14</sup> is another indication of the usual lack of understanding and appreciation in the West of the strength of Indonesian nationalism and Indonesia's aspirations. The tendency in the West to take for granted what may be perceived as Indonesia's pro-West stance in its foreign relations under the new order -- a stance motivated at least as much by pragmatism as by any

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<sup>14</sup>See David D. Newsom, "Letter from Indonesia," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 30, 1984.



other considerations -- reveals insensitivity to its need for the maintenance of its credentials as a major non-aligned nation and for a more active role in the world arena commensurate with its potentials.

Moreover, the concern in the West that Indonesia does not seem to be unduly worried about the "Soviet threat" despite the Soviet presence in Cam Rahn and Da Nang and the increasing Soviet military capabilities in the Pacific serves only to indicate differences between the US and Indonesia in perception and priority in matters of security. Indeed, such differences are likely to continue to exist. To overlook or dismiss them as irrelevant would not help the promotion of a mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries.

Whether or not the recent Geneva summit and the whole Geneva process of negotiations will have a positive impact on the region of Southeast Asia and by implication on US-Indonesian relations is likely to depend on whether they will eventually lead to the management of superpower relations and competition -- which is likely to continue, come what may -- in such a way as to take due account of regional interests, aspirations, perceptions, and priorities. These include their desire to develop their national and regional resilience, to avoid as much external interference as possible, and to bear a primary responsibility for their national and regional security and stability, in which both the nations of the region and the external great powers will hopefully find a common interest.

## THE CHINA FACTOR

Although the Sino-Soviet rift had begun earlier and gradually came into the open around the end of the 1950s, the Cuban missile confrontation and the ensuing period of detente between the superpowers seemed to have helped highlight the widening rift. If Soviet withdrawal from Cuba called forth sharp Chinese criticism of Soviet weakness and cowardice in the face of an imperialist bluff, the developing detente between the superpowers subsequently provoked Chinese attacks on what it called superpower collusion and hegemonism.

Thus even if the growing detente did not make the two superpowers close friends, let alone allies, and indeed despite their continued adversary relationship, they came to find in China a common enemy. The Sino-Soviet dispute had resulted, as it were, in a new alignment among the great powers. And US policy of containment in the Far East, which had initially been an extension of that policy in Europe to the East in the wake of the successful Chinese revolution and the outbreak of the Korean war, was then directed primarily against Chinese communism rather than Soviet-inspired communist expansion. That

perhaps partly explains the escalation of the Vietnam war during and in spite of the period of detente between the superpowers and despite the fact that not only China but also the Soviet Union, for its own reasons, continued to support Vietnam to the very end of the war.

That new great power alignment beginning in the early 1960s, coupled with domestic developments in Indonesia following the communist coup attempt in 1965, provided an atmosphere that was favourable for improvement in US-Indonesian relations. The continued deterioration of Indonesia's relations with the Soviet Union, which had begun well before the attempted coup, the sudden surge of anti-communist sentiment in the country, and above all the rapidly growing hostility toward China resulting in the suspension of diplomatic relations between the two countries, coupled with Indonesia's need for new sources of foreign aid, all these led to a new convergence of interests between Indonesia and the United States.

Indeed, US-Indonesian relations improved and expanded rapidly in the next decade with the US playing an increasingly significant role, together with other Western countries including Japan, in the revival of the Indonesian economy in terms of aid and investment. It also resumed its supply of military aid to Indonesia. This has created what appears as a pro-Western posture in Indonesia's foreign relations and orientation. The defeat of communism in Indonesia, be it of Soviet or Chinese brand, without external help, has virtually served, if unwittingly, US strategic interest.

However, to interpret the surge of anti-communist sentiment in Indonesia, which for some time, indeed, was not conducive to an improvement in its relations with communist countries, particularly China and the Soviet Union, as an abandonment of its independent and active or non-aligned foreign policy, would be a gross misreading of Indonesia's new nationalism, realism and pragmatism. Indonesia's anti-communism is primarily of domestic dimension and not to be projected beyond its national boundaries in the conduct of its foreign policy. The drastic shift in the new order's practice of foreign policy in the direction of pro-Western orientation was based more on realistic and pragmatic considerations of its vital national interests than on ideological orientation.

It is nonetheless true that in the face of China of that period the United States and Indonesia shared in a sense a common enemy, if with differing perceptions of the form of threat posed by China. In fact, to that extent US-Indonesian relations during the decade of 1965-1975 have been described as a "de facto alliance association" without the conclusion of a formal treaty.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Juwono Sudarsono, "Indonesia and the United States, 1966-1975: An Inquiry into a De Facto Alliance Association," Ph.D. thesis, LSE, University of London, 1979.

It is therefore understandable that the advent of Sino-US accommodation early in the last decade in part to prepare the ground for US withdrawal from Vietnam was, for Indonesia, "the abandonment by one partner in de facto alliance of an original common *raison d'être*" and a "blow to the Soeharto Administration."<sup>16</sup>

Sino-US accommodation gained increasing momentum as detente between the superpowers was breaking down in the latter part of the last decade despite the signing of the SALT II agreement. That accommodation or reconciliation had been crowned by the visit of the Chinese leader, Deng Xiao-ping, to the US and the opening of diplomatic relations between the two countries, almost three decades after the birth of the PRC. Another great power re-alignment was taking place. Though perhaps somewhat belatedly, the US was beginning to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

To be sure, in spite of some degree of disillusionment Indonesia, as the weaker and more dependent partner in the US-Indonesian de facto alliance association, was not in a position to penalise its stronger partner and had no choice but to continue its dependence on the US. In spite of repeated verbal assurances to the contrary, it is not difficult to understand Indonesia's concern over the possibility that in its new dealing with China often marked by obvious euphoria about China and its rosy representation the US would not sacrifice Southeast Asia's, especially Indonesia's, interests. Such a concern has been related to China being a potential rival to Indonesia in terms of trade and investment.

More importantly, however, it is related also to Indonesia's perception of the Chinese threat notwithstanding the widespread belief that under the supposedly pragmatic and moderate leadership of Deng Xiao-ping China is now a more or less contended status quo power, no longer challenging the legitimacy of the present international order. And with the launching of its four-modernisation programme, China is believed to be more inwardly oriented and, perhaps, less prone to aggressive behaviour.

Nevertheless, however irrational it may be, there continue to be suspicions and doubts in Indonesia about China's long-term intentions in Southeast Asia. If ill-defined, there continues to be fear of some vague form of Chinese threat. The memories of Chinese involvement in the events of the mid 1960s may still be lingering in the minds of many. China's constant refusal to make a formal and categorical statement that it will not assist communist movements in

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<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 289; I thank Dr. Juwono Sudarsono for making his thesis available and for his permission to quote from it.

Southeast Asia any more in the future as demanded by Indonesia in order to normalise relations between the two countries serves only to suggest that it has not abandoned, and probably never will abandon, that important tenet of its foreign policy.

Moreover, there is no assurance that given the possibility of success in the future in China's modernisation programme, which would result in its increased economic, technological, and military capabilities, it will continue to pursue its "moderate" policy and not revert to a militant and revolutionary stance or emerge as a rising global power with claims to global and regional roles, interests, and influence, which are not necessarily positive and constructive. US-Chinese agreements on arms sale and nuclear development, despite their formal limitations, may help sustain such suspicions and doubts.

Indeed, increasing US-Chinese relations have given rise not only to concern about possible implications for the security, political, and economic interests of the nations in Southeast Asia, but also to some confusion about US strategic and foreign policy interest. If the containment of communist expansion -- be it of red or yellow tinge -- should remain a major imperative of US policy, at least its dealing with China must have been motivated more by its state interest that seems to have little to do with its anti-communist rhetorics. Indeed, basically there is nothing wrong with that. Enthusiastic comments on China's apparent attempts at adapting Marxist-Leninist teachings to its internal needs and problems as though they were entirely new phenomena. In the direction of capitalistic reforms and the development of a genuine free enterprise system are not more than a reflection of wishful thinking that underestimates the importance of Marxist-Leninist ideology to the communist parties all over the world as a primarily basis of their legitimacy and monopoly of state power. Though in varying degrees, such attempts have been made by most, if not all, communist countries since the days of Lenin himself. If such romantic descriptions are meant to justify close relationship with China, reading too much into its pragmatic efforts to cope with its concrete problems and to meet its real needs and perhaps at the same time to strengthen the appeal of its opening to the West, then they seem hardly necessary.

Positive and constructive actions that demonstrate genuine concern and sensitivity to the sentiments of the people in this region would be more convincing to allay doubts, fears, and suspicions and to build confidence than mere verbal assurances and unnecessary rhetorics. These are still apparently lacking in US approach and policy. The possibility explored for President Reagan's visit to Jakarta after Peking, after his previous visit to Jakarta had been cancelled the previous year, was a case in point. US vague policy of supporting ASEAN all the way regarding the Kampuchean conflict, which in ef-

fect, at least for some time, amounted more to supporting the Chinese position, is another.<sup>17</sup>

Indeed, in view of its close association with China, renewed relationship with the Soviet Union, and its influence and capabilities, as well as in the light of its own strategic interests, the United States is in a position to play a more positive and constructive role. Given the political will, such a role may be played not only over the long run but also in the immediate future.

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

Because of its history and geopolitical position, Indonesia's attitude toward the great powers is likely to continue to be characterised by ambivalence and suspicion. Whatever its apparent style in its implementation, Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy is a manifestation of these basic characteristics.

Historical and geopolitical factors also shape Indonesia's perception of national and regional security. And whatever manner of its expression, Indonesia is likely to continue to make efforts at the realisation of its ambition to play an important and positive role as a major power in regional as well as international affairs commensurate with its potentials.

Mutual recognition and understanding of both similarities and differences in such basic views and perceptions and mutual sensitivity to each other's concern on the part of both the United States and Indonesia will foster a balanced, if not necessarily symmetrical, interdependent and mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. And given a proper management of relations among the great powers, this will certainly apply to Indonesia's relations with the rest of the great powers. But until and unless such lofty ideals are translated into concrete actions, they will be no more than trite diplomatic gobbledygook.

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<sup>17</sup>See "Jakarta too Busy for Reagan?" *Jakarta Post*, 29 October 1983.

# Book Reviews

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## A State without Dispute

**From the State of Eastern Indonesia towards the Republic of the United States of Indonesia** (in Indonesian: *Dari Negara Indonesia Timur ke Republik Indonesia Serikat*) by Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1985, 848 pp. The following reviews are written by respectively Dr. Burhan Magenda, translated from the original review in *Tempo*, 8th February 1986, and Dr. Juwono Sudarsono, translated from the original review in *Kompas*, 16 th March 1986.

### Burhan MAGENDA

One of the gaps in Indonesia's modern political history is the insufficient knowledge on the political process that occurred in the "State" established after the Malino Conference on 16th July 1946. This happened because existing books on political history were generally making a study on the revolution centred around Java and Sumatra only.

During the period between the Linggarjati Agreement (1946) and the Recognition of Indonesia's Sovereignty (December 1949), the territory that had relatively been undisturbed

by upheavals were the Eastern part of Indonesia and the greater part of the Island of Kalimantan. That stability was due to the difficult terrain, that limits the activities of the guerilla forces. For example, in South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi, the only guerilla forces were the Fourth Division of ALRI (The Navy of the Republic of Indonesia) and a number of expedition troops from Java. The remaining territory was marked by a "peaceful" situation -- which greatly differed from the situation in Java and Sumatra which was full of upheavals.

This book describes the other side of the peaceful situation of Eastern Indonesia, namely the existence of a political system which was able to absorb the principal forces in that territory, and was very functional in nature, so as to give it a new perspective not much known so far. According to Anak Agung, Negara Indonesia Timur (The State of East Indonesia) was the only state which was established by virtue of Governor General Van Mook's plan (and that of the Dutch in general) to establish RIS (The United States of Indonesia) since the Linggarjati Agreement. Anak Agung blamed Van Mook, who did not keep to his promise and established so many states -- at the time of the dissolution of RIS. In August 1950, there were 14 states -- with the intent to encircle the Republic of Indonesia. Whereas according to the original plan, there should only be 3 states forming the United States of Indonesia, namely Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan and Timur Besar (NIT = The State of East Indonesia).

Why could NIT be so functional during its existence, from December 1946 until its incorporation into the Unitary State of the Republic

of Indonesia, in August 1950? This book has given the answer. Firstly, it was due to the fact that NIT was born after the Dutch military operation that had brought the Westerling Incident in South Sulawesi and the Puputan War in Bali. Therefore, for three and a half years, the NIT government had run its course without any conflict with the Republican Army or guerilla forces, as experienced by many of the states in Java and Sumatra.

Secondly, NIT basically constituted a political entity which had functioned for a long time, namely since the establishment of the Timur Besar province, which was centred in Makassar, in 1938. And the prominents that had subscribed to NIT were the same local authorities, and had established mutual co-operation since the period before the Japanese occupation. It was not an exaggeration if Anak Agung called NIT an "ideal state of a federal system."

In the NIT, out of the existing political unit, around 75 per cent comprised autonomous governments bound by short-term contracts with the Dutch (113 in number) and long-term ones (only 3 sultanates in Sumbawa). Those political units were virtually not yet tied up to the government of the Republic of Indonesia in Yogya. Owing to the limited geographic mobility, the people in the NIT territory did not have the opportunity to wage a guerilla war. However, Anak Agung also points out how the NIT government encompassed a very wide political spectrum, starting as from the National Progressive faction led by Arnold Mononutu (in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, he became a prominent figure of PNI) who was pro the Republic, up to a prominent such as Mawaikere from the Minahasa, who wanted his region to become the twelfth province of Holland.

Between the two extremes there existed an idea of a "genuine federalist," who wanted NIT to become part of the United States of Indonesia (RIS) with autonomous rights, in line with the concept of Hatta and Sjahrir, before the idea of federalism was "hijacked" by Van Mook. This group of "genuine federalists"

was represented by three prominents, namely Tjokorde Gde Raka Soekowati (President of NIT; King of Tabanan, Bali), Anak Agung Gde Agung (Prime Minister of NIT; King of Gianyar, Bali), and Mohammad Kaharöedin (Speaker of the NIT parliament, Sultan of Sumbawa) who became the "stabiliser" of the short-lived NIT.

Another group was that of the "extreme federalists," who wanted to have a minimally possible tie with Jakarta. Its leader was Soumokil from Ambon. At the time when the group of "genuine federalists" was incorporated into the RIS (Anak Agung became the Home Affairs Minister of RIS, and Kaharuddin a member of RIS senate), the group of "extreme federalists" felt being isolated in Makassar -- who thereafter, with the support of a troop comprising more than 5,000 ex-KNIL soldiers whose fate was uncertain, proclaimed the well-known separatist movement and revolt of the Republic of South Maluku (RMS).

One of the issues debated in this book is Anak Agung's view with regard to Nadjamuddin Daeng Malewa, the first prime minister of NIT, who survived only for several months. According to Anak Agung, Nadjamuddin's dismissal as prime minister by NIT's Acting President Mohammad Kaharöedin was merely due to the misuse of textiles for the Lebaran. Whereas Nadjamuddin's close friends, such as Manaj Sophian and Achmad Siala, put forward political arguments. They opined that Nadjamuddin became uncontrollable in his political demands.

When Nadjamuddin was dismissed, he and Soekowati were on their way home from New York after attending a debate on Indonesia at the UN, particularly on violations of the cease fire by the Dutch. After having met Sjahrir and Indonesia's representatives at the UN, he began to have doubts about the Dutch policy, and even demanded that NIT be allowed to have their representatives abroad.

It was said that Nadjamuddin belonged to the "genuine federalists" group, but had a very strong Makassarésé character. He was actively

engaged in trade activities and navigation -- and was even regarded as the Godfather of Makassar traders. He had run his business activities since the 1930s, so that his economic position was quite high. The more so, during the Japanese occupation he happened to be the first indigenous mayor in Makassar. In this respect his activities concerning textiles for the Lebaran was only a new form of his Godfather's characteristic (patron client relationship), which has for long been institutionalised.

Nadjamuddin's political activities were less known compared with his commercial activities. He once joined the PBI (Persatoean Bangsa Indonesia = Indonesian Nationalist Movement) under Dr. Sutomo in the 1930s, and thereafter founded the "Partai Sulawesi Selatan" (the Party of South Sulawesi) -- which was perhaps the first regional party in Indonesia. His joining the NIT was also a historic miracle, since nearly all the nobility of South Sulawesi had already sided with Arumpone, under the leadership of Ande Mappanyukki who was on the side of the Republic. Compounded by the Dutch policy in replacing Mappanyukki with Andi Pabenteng as Arumpone (whereas one of Mappanyukki's children was killed in the Westerling Affair), this issue became a traditional *siri* issue (self respect). As a consequence, NIT was marked by peripheral representatives from Buginese - Makassar nobility.

It was this gap that was filled by Nadjamuddin Daeng Malewa, who was a mixed blood of Buton and Makassar descent, and who possessed a wide network of friends along the coast of South Sulawesi owing to his trade in copra and his fleet. During his tenure as PM of NIT, his exclusive and intolerant chauvenism was very striking. In such a small bureaucracy, such things became very conspicuous. Moreover his religious fanaticism was not so conducive to establishing close co-operation with other prominents in the pluralistic region of NIT.

Accordingly when Nadjamuddin committed a political error through his actions in New York and Amsterdam, his political opponents reacted immediately. Seemingly, the "brain" behind Nadjamuddin's overthrow

was Soumokil, who assumed the function of Minister of Justice, assisted by the Minister of Health, Dr. Warouw and Deputy Minister of Finance, R.E.J. Matekohy.

Investigations conducted by the team of Soumokil-Matekohy revealed things that drove Nadjamuddin into a corner. Consequently, for the sake of political peace, Nadjamuddin was finally dismissed by the Acting President of NIT, Kaharoeidin.

However, this regional and tribal conflict did not end with Warouw's replacement of Nadjamuddin as prime minister. The ensuing manoeuvres led to the appointment of Anak Agung as prime minister, which he practically maintained until his inclusion in the RIS government in Jakarta.

Another case presented in this book is the beginning of the RMS revolt under Soumokil, who together with Matekohy had planned it from Makassar. Aside from being motivated by the idea of "extreme federalism," it was also due to Soumokil's ambition himself. A question arises: would the RMS revolt still happen, had Soumokil felt "attracted" to the Jakarta government, and had not felt isolated in Makassar at the time when the NIT government had already been dominated by the people of the Republic?

This case reminds us to the central role played by prominent figures such as Nadjamuddin and Dr. Soumokil, about whom only a few studies have been made. As a figure with the highest educational background among his peers in the NIT, Soumokil appeared to fail in achieving the highest position, which eventually led to his deep disappointment. In a situation like in Makassar in early 1950, which was already filled with Indonesian Army troops from Java and ex-South Sulawesi guerillas, one can imagine how Soumokil was lured by the position he failed to occupy in the NIT, namely the prime ministership, although the RMS was quickly disbanded shortly afterwards.

Hence, in studying such figures like Soumokil, one should not look into the matter in



a simplistic way, which is also applicable to the case of Nadjamuddin. It is in this regard that one may benefit from this literary work of Anak Agung, albeit he does not elaborate specifically upon the issue (perhaps to avoid offending his friends), the date are quite adequate to illustrate the tribal and regional political intrigues, and which was regional in nature at the time of the NIT, which is also useful to us now.

### Juwono SUDARSONO

Not much is known about the critical period in the years 1945 to 1950 outside the islands of Java and Sumatra. During that period, the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed on 17th August 1945, had its authority only over Java and Sumatra. The greater part of territories of the archipelago was governed by the Allied forces which had the task to disarm the then occupying forces of Japan that surrendered after the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6th and 9th August.

The story as told by Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung in his book *Dari Negara Indonesia Timur ke Republik Indonesia Serikat* elaborates how different the problems were faced by Indonesians in eastern Indonesia (Sulawesi, Maluku, Lesser Sunda Islands) during the political transition period 1945-1950. This story is being told to show that the State of East-Indonesia, established as a result of the Denpasar Conference held in December 1946, was not a political entity which was fully established by the Dutch-East-Indies government who attempted to re-instate its authority over the archipelago after its exile in Brisbane, Australia, during Japanese occupation 1942-1945.

The particular problem faced in eastern-Indonesia is the historical fact that mentioned territory, during Japanese occupation, was governed by the Royal Navy of the Kingdom of Japan. Unlike the occupation force on Java by the Army, the leadership of Japan's Royal Navy having its headquarters in Makassar, was not promoting Indonesia's political leaders to

move towards the attainment of independence, resulting in the near absence of any local political movement at the time of the proclamation of independence in Jakarta.

The more unfortunate was that the Allied forces units on duty in eastern Indonesia, were Australian and British troops sympathising with the Dutch efforts in regaining their colony which for some years had been occupied by the Japanese. Gradually the effective authority of the Dutch-East-Indies' colonial apparatus was being entrenched by mobilising the Dutch troops and the civilian bureaucracy, NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration).

While the Republic of Indonesia moved to Yogyakarta and resistance by republican forces was being waged on Java and Sumatra, attention of the world press to other regions of the archipelago was diminishing. Under such confusing circumstances, it is understandable that suspicions were aroused between the republicans and Indonesians who were within the territory governed by the Dutch-East-Indies apparatus, especially by republicans towards their countrymen who were within the Dutch-East-Indies governmental establishment. One of the objectives in writing this book is to expound how difficult the situation was as faced by Indonesians who were accused of collaborating with the colonial government. Whereas in fact, in many instances, their morale and spirit were not less nationalistic compared to the republican fighters who incidentally were faced with quite a different situation and terrain.

The basic theme of Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung's work is the efforts made by various circles in NIT (Negara Indonesia Timur -- The State of East Indonesia) to implement and to achieve a political synthesis between NIT and the Republic of Indonesia having its headquarters in Yogyakarta. If steps taken by several leaders of NIT were felt being less consistent in its execution, this was due to the colonial power which was still prevailing outside Java compared to the situation developed in the battle ridden areas in Java, such as Bandung, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Surabaya and other such places which have already become the treasury of Indonesia's national history.

A time period of more than 35 years has elapsed after those events in the past, which makes it possible for one to quietly comprehend the political nuances in NIT faced by its prominents, such as by the writer of this book.

Due to the many events exposed in this book by Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, the writer of this book review will therefore confine himself to some events which clarify as to how difficult the situation was, as faced by Indonesians in NIT in fulfilling a commitment towards the attainment of unity with their countrymen within the Republic of Indonesia.

One of the striking things was the difference in perception between the then Indonesian Republican Vice President, Mohammad Hatta, and representatives of NIT who participated in the Malino Conference of July 1946. As already known, the Malino Conference has among other things discussed the form of the state which should be established during the still uncertain transitional period. In his capacity of Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia, Mohammad Hatta criticised the Malino Conference which he accused as being a Dutch effort in splitting the unity of Indonesia under the pretext of establishing an autonomous government in eastern Indonesia.

Mohammad Hatta, in an interview by radio Yogyakarta on 17th July 1946 mentioned that the convening of the Malino Conference was forced at the point of a gun by the Dutch government. This statement was regarded as an offence by the Indonesian participants (a.o. Daeng Mattajang, Soekawati, Sultan Hamid and Dengah). They opined that Indonesians in eastern Indonesia cannot separate themselves from the developments in Java and Sumatra. But they also wished that people in the Republic of Indonesia understand the "specific situation" faced by them owing to the strength of the Dutch-East-Indies government having their headquarters in Makassar after the transfer of the governmental responsibilities and security from the Allied forces to CONICA in the beginning of July 1946. Perhaps realising that in the future the position of the government of eastern Indonesia should

be guarded in the best possible manner, their leaders deemed it necessary to emphasise that the form of the state they desired was to be a federation. This was exposed in a special section related to the "Relations with the Republic of Indonesia" in which mention was made, for example, "to request the attention of Sjahrir et. al. to mentioned resolutions" (meaning the form of a federal government). It is understandable as to why people in the Republic of Indonesia were suspicious against the Indonesian participants at the Malino Conference which they regarded as "collaborating with the Dutch."

#### LINGGARJATI AND WEST IRIAN

The State of East-Indonesia was born on 24th December 1946 after a fortnight's session. It initially was to cover what was known as the Greater-East and Kalimantan, but because of the political situation in Kalimantan, it ultimately consisted of representatives of 13 regions (starting from North Sulawesi as far as Sumba) with 55 representatives and other 15 persons representing minorities (descendants of Arabs, Chinese and others). NIT was born by virtue of a chain of quite interesting events. After the failure of the conference between the Indonesian Republic and the Dutch at the Hoge Veluwe in April 1946, an election was held in the Netherlands in May. It was the Catholic Party that won the election and led the new government under Dr. H.J.M. Beel. The Beel cabinet sent a mission consisting of three persons led by Prof. Shermerhorn for the continuation of the negotiations between the Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch which had ended in a deadlock. The negotiations held in October-November 1946 resulted in what is known as the Linggarjati Agreement which among other things stated that the future territory of the Federal Republic of Indonesia should consist of the Republic of Indonesia (Java, Madura and Sumatra), Kalimantan and the Greater-East.

Much is already known regarding Linggarjati as a controversial phase in national history, particularly between those who emphasise diplomacy and those who give priority to

armed struggle. However not many people are aware of the controversy among the Dutch which caused the Linggarjati Agreement "being differently interpreted" from that agreed upon on 15th November 1946. The prime problem was concerned with the failure to return Irian-Jaya (then called Irian-Barat/West-New-Guinea) within the framework of the recognition of the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia since that territory was to be utilised as the territory for spreading the Catholic religion.

The course of Indonesia's revolution during the time period of 1945-1950 is inopportune for those who wish to explain the nuances of political developments in territories far away from those governed by the Republic of Indonesia. Political developments both international and in the archipelago itself gradually tend to justify the republican rather than the federal course. Such general statements are generally known from stories in textbooks of history.

#### FEELINGS OF SOLIDARITY

Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung's merit is found in that he is giving clarifications to those who sincerely study Indonesia's political history, that sometimes events in the past cannot be explained in terms of black and white. Political considerations, feelings of uncertainty, incorrect estimates, different interpretations concerning certain events, certain utterances or behaviour of persons at given times, all these often cannot be judged correctly.

Evidence that the State of East-Indonesia had feelings of solidarity with the Republic of Indonesia was that the cabinet of Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung resigned at the time the Dutch aggression was launched on 19th December 1948, when the Republic of Indonesia was cornered.

In such a situation of dissaray and apprehension among the people in the Republic of Indonesia after the Dutch aggression, they did not have the chance to know that their

countrymen had shown their sympathies and had protested by resigning.

Other interesting points are the feelings of uneasiness experienced by government officials from the State of East-Indonesia who were made to join the Dutch delegation to the United Nation's General Assembly session to rival the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia led by Sutan Sjahrir. This was however foiled due to the stance of the Syrian, Indian, Philippine and Soviet delegations who consistently defended the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia and regarded it being the sole representative of the Indonesian nation.

Nor are endeavours made by the government of the State of East-Indonesia, particularly under Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, to convene an Inter-Indonesia Conference in the eve of the establishment of the Federal Republic of Indonesia, widely known. The Inter-Indonesia Conference held at the Kepatihan in Yogyakarta from 19th to 22nd July 1949 proved that in the situation prior to the recognition of sovereignty, the Republic of Indonesia admitted that its *de facto* authority over the archipelago at that time was still very limited.

*From the State of East-Indonesia to the Federal Republic of Indonesia* is not a book easy to read. However as is the case with Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung's book entitled *Renville* (Sinar Harapan, 1984) this work is laden with data of research findings from archives in the Netherlands as well as in Indonesia, including Ujungpandang (formerly called Makassar) the capital of the State of East-Indonesia. This book proves that man in historical events can only be fully understood within the contexts of space and time and the problems he faces. Viewed from this angle, this book constitutes a research work and at the same time an eye-opener of "history as a guide to national and state life."

## To Expose PNI and Its Self Image

**PNI and Its Politics: 1963-1969** (in Indonesian: *PNI dan Kepolitikannya, 1963-1969*) by Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin. Jakarta: Rajawali, 1984, xiii + 221 pp. This review article is written by M. Djadjiono, a staff member of the Department of Political Affairs, CSIS.

This book entitled *PNI dan Kepolitikannya, 1963-1969* (PNI and Its Politics) is derived from the thesis presented by the author to the Political Department of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Politics of the University of Indonesia in 1970.

This book is divided into six chapters. Chapter I discusses the background of PNI and its organisational structure up to 1965, also its role in the wake of the Guided Democracy period including its relationship with Soekarno, PKI and the Indonesian Army. Chapter II expounds the development evolving within the body of PNI around the years 1965-1966: why a rift occurred, factors causing the rift, and its impact on the party's life and that of national politics. Chapter III elaborates on the restructuring of PNI after the rift and Soeharto's role in reuniting PNI. Chapter IV discusses PNI's stance with regard to political problems during the early New Order period: PNI's stance vis-à-vis Soekarno's power; its stance with regard to the New Order leadership, the formation of the Ampera Cabinet, the founding of the new Islamic Party, the restructuring of the political infrastructure, the General Election and also its stance with regard to the Jakarta Charter. Chapter V discusses the patterns of relationships between PNI and the New Order, either at the national level or at the regional one. This book is finally concluded by Chapter VI, in which it among other things stated that PNI's role during the period prior to that of the New Order was quite conspicuous, whereas after the birth of the New Order, it is no longer dominant in state politics.

## THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PNI AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

As a point of departure in discussing PNI and its politics, Dr. Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin uses the Government Decree No. X dated 3rd November 1945 which was announced by Vice President Mohammad Hatta. That Government Decree concerned gave to the Indonesian people the greatest possible opportunity to form political parties. This was among other things responded by Indonesia's nationalist figures, such as S. Mangunsarkoro and Osa Maliki by forming the Serikat Rakjat Indonesia (Serindo -- United Indonesian People's party). Serindo held its first congress in Kediri on 29th January 1946, followed suit by local nationalist parties such as, PNI-Pati, PNI-Palembang, PNI-Madiun, PNI-Sulawesi, Serikat Nasional in Bandung, Persatuan Nasional in South Kalimantan, Ikatan Nasional in East Kalimantan and the like (pp. 3-4). This first Serindo congress agreed on forming a PNI party as a fusion of mentioned small parties.

In its development up to 1965, PNI had been under the leadership of an Executive Board which comprised: General Chairman, Ali Sastroamidjojo; Chairman I, Hardi; Chairman II, Osa Maliki; Chairman III, M. Isa; Chairman IV, Roeslan Abdulgani; Secretary General, Surachman; Deputy Secretary General, Mh. Isnaeni; Treasurer, S. Hadikusumo (p. 8). Unfortunately its dynamics since 1946-1965 has not been expounded in this part. For further study of this episode see also: J. Elisco Rocamora, *The Partai Nasional Indonesia 1963-1965*, October 1970. The composition referred to above also brought about the frictions within its body (pp. 8-9). Dr. Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin holds the view that a strong or weak PNI leadership depended to a large extent on how close the one concerned was to President Soekarno (p. 8).

## RIFT AND EFFORTS FOR REUNITING PNI

Although it is not explicitly spelt out by the author, the rift that occurred within PNI in 1965 may be divided into two parts: (1) the rift

occurring before the September 30-Movement/ Communist Party abortive coup, and (2) the rift that happened the day after the abortive communist coup and beyond. The rift occurring before the communist abortive coup was caused by controversies emerging among PNI leaders due to the conflicts between supporters of PNI and those of the PKI in Central Java. On the one hand, Ali Sastroamidjojo (General Chairman) and Surachman (Secretary General) dismissed Hadisubeno as Chairman-I of PNI's Regional Executive Board of Central Java and Soetopo Koesoemodirdjo, Chairman-III of the same Executive Board, including the First Chairman of the Local Board of Pati and that of Cilacap respectively, who were held responsible for the circulation of brochures and pamphlets from Central Java discrediting some prominent of the Central Executive Board of PNI. Meanwhile, Hardi and Isnaeni defended Hadisubeno and association. As a consequence two factions of PNI leadership emerged: (1) the faction of Ali-Surachman; and (2) that of Hardi-Isnaeni-Hadisubeno (pp. 33-37).

On the event of the communist abortive coup, the Central Executive Board of PNI made a statement with overtones of supporting PKI. Mentioned statement was signed by Surachman and was issued on 1st October 1965, only a few hours after Lieutenant-Colonel Untung announced that measures had been taken against some Army Generals and that President Soekarno had been saved (p. 47). The faction of Hardi and associates reacted strongly against that statement, and on 6th October 1965 they formed a rival Central Executive Board of the PNI with Osa Maliki as the General Chairman and Usep Ranuwidjaja as its Secretary General (p. 51). Unlike Ali-Surachman, the Central Executive Board of Osa-Usep strongly condemned the G-30-S/ PKI's abortive coup and expected Soekarno to dissolve PKI and take strong actions against its agents or those masterminding the coup (p. 54). As a consequence, Hardi and associates were dismissed by Ali-Surachman.

Dr. Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin also stated that the rift occurring in the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) was also caused by:

(1) the difference in socio-geographical and politico-cultural backgrounds of the contending PNI figures; (2) the difference in the socio-economic background among the contending groups: Hardi and associates, for example, were said to come from well to do families, whereas Ali-Surachman and associates were assumed to come from the economically weak group; (3) and personal rivalry (pp. 31-46).

The event of the rift in the body of PNI brought about deep concern amongst the PNI elders. Hence Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo, one of PNI's founding fathers and concurrently member of the party's Deliberative Council (Badan Musyawarah) took the initiative of settling the conflict prevalent in the Party (PNI). On 23rd November 1965, Iskaq took the initiative to form the Panitia Penegak Persatuan dan Kesatuan PNI/Front Marhaenis (Committee for the Upholding of the Unity and Integrity of PNI/Front Marhaenis) with the main task "to revive the unity and integrity of PNI/Front Marhaenis which had been dis-united" (pp. 73-81). This committee of Iskaq apparently did not succeed in uniting PNI since Ali-Sartono (Sartono replaced Surachman after the latter had been dismissed due to his involvement in the Communist G-30-S Movement) did not want to recognise the existence of PNI's Central Executive Board under Osa-Usep whereas Iskaq did recognise both Boards (pp. 81-89).

After General Soeharto, the then Minister of Defence and Security and assigned with the task of carrying out the 11th March Order held a dialogue and a meeting between the contending parties, and only then a concensus could eventually be reached by all parties to hold a Congress for the unity and integrity of PNI in Bandung from 24th - 28th April 1966 chaired by Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo (pp. 89-97). This Bandung Congress succeeded in forming a new Central Executive Board of PNI which comprised: General Chairman, Osa Maliki; Co-Chairmen were respectively Hardi, Sabilah Rasyad, Isnaeni, Hadikusumo, Sunawar and Abdul Madjid; Secretary General I, Usep; Secretary General II, Jaksa; Secretary General III, Abadi. The Congress also decided that the

decision of the party's central leadership dated the 14th May 1965 and 4th August 1965 concerning the dismissal of Hadisubeno and Hardi and their associates be nullified (p. 103).

Although the Congress for the unity and integrity of PNI had been held, during the period thereafter there were still many problems to be faced by PNI. The Central Executive Board then purged PNI from PKI (Communist) elements by dismissing Ali-Surachman's followers who were directly or indirectly involved in the September-30-Movement. The PNI cadres who were introduced by Ali-Surachman were dissatisfied with the outcome of the Bandung Congress and identified themselves as: "Anak Soekarno," "Aku Pendukung Soekarno" ("I am Soekarno's supporter"), "Benteng-benteng Rakyat," and the "Gerakan Maju Tak Gentar" movements in the regions of Central and East Java. There were among them who joined the Mbah Suro movement together with remnants of PKI in East Java. Those cadres were also terrorising the anti-communist society including KAMI (Indonesian Students Action Front), KAPPI (Indonesian High School Students Action Front) and the religious groups. The existence of those movements had put PNI in a difficult position vis-à-vis the New Order (pp. 105-107). Another problem that also emerged was that of the Marhaenism Declaration which among other things stated that Marhaenism was the application of Marxism in Indonesia adjusted to its condition and situation (pp. 102-120).

#### PNI AND ITS SELF-IMAGE

As regard PNI's self-image, though not divided by the author, it can basically be divided into two parts: (1) PNI's self-image during the Guided Democracy period (during the tenure of President Soekarno); and (2) PNI's self-image during the New Order period. During the period of Guided Democracy PNI's self-image appeared as: (a) a nationalist party since it was founded by people adhering to nationalism (p. 3); (b) cadre party, since although possessing mass organisations, their members however did not have any right whatsoever on the party except that they had

become members of the party (pp. 5-7); (c) a party having close relations with PKI as conspicuous from the fact that it interpreted Marhaenism as being Marxism applied in Indonesia, its support for the Nasakom-isation of ABRI (the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), its support for the idea to establish the Fifth Force (pp. 13-18); a party having close relations with Soekarno and obtained many positions in government institutions (p. 20 and also pp. 124-160).

During the New Order period, PNI's self-image appeared as: (a) a party with an ambivalent stance towards the leadership of the New Order, which was also "irrational" in nature (p. 149 and also pp. 162-164); (b) a party that has lost its position amongst government institutions (pp. 161-165); (c) a party ambitious to come back to the fore on the national political platform playing a prime role as was apparent from its demand that the General Election be held soon (pp. 172-176); (d) a party supporting the concept of restructuring the political infrastructure as forwarded by the New Order but rejecting un-democratic means (the dissolution of parties). The restructuring of the political infrastructure should be carried out democratically based on the general election as the legitimacy of the existence of parties (pp. 170-172); (e) a party that was persistently opposing the Jakarta Charter (theocracy). PNI is of the view that issues such as the Jakarta Charter, be it forwarded by the Islamic or Christian group would be rejected by PNI, since it was the party's stance that such matters should not be regulated by positive law. Abiding by the precepts means that one's religion should be the individual citizen's own affair and need not be regulated by the state (pp. 176-177). Aside from that, another self-image that is worthy of note is that of a party which was always beset by internal conflicts amongst its leaders. As to this last self-image, Dr. Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin holds the view that those conflicts have also affected PDI's position (PDI = Indonesian Democracy Party) after PNI's fusion in that party together with four other parties (pp. viii-ix).

Although the author of this book states that since the fusion of PNI into PDI, PNI has no

longer been mentioned in society, which by the author is said as being officially abolished from the dictionary on political parties in Indonesia, apparently this book which is originally the author's thesis as a partial fulfilment in obtaining his academic degree majoring in politics at the University of Indonesia, this book will remain a book which is monumental in the literature of political parties which is still scarce in Indonesia. Notwithstanding its difficult content, it is still interesting to read, moreover in view of the fact that it has been written in a scientific manner, emphasising its objectivity.

## Reality or Projection?

*Islamic Dynamism in Indonesia* (in Indonesian: *Dinamika Islam di Indonesia -- A Socio-Political View*) by M. Rusli Karim. Yogyakarta: Hanindita, 1985. viii + 318 pp. This review article is written by Suwardi, a staff member of the Department of Political Affairs, CSIS.

This book contains a description on Islam in Indonesia, particularly during the last two decades seen from the socio-political point of view. This book is an attempt to present a projection of the Islamic community in Indonesia, written by a young moslem scholar, endowed with a general educational background (IKIP) and a religious one (IAIN). The author, Karim, divides his book into four big chapters, which are as follows: the vocation of Islam to man, the current Indonesian Islamic community, the Indonesian moslems viewed from the angle of leadership and politics, and finally the conclusion.

As the basis of his discussion (Chapter I) Karim puts forward some conceptions on Islam by generally asserting that Islam is not only a matter of religion, but covers also a perfect worldview on all facets of human life, be it at the individual or social, material or

moral-spiritual, economic or political, legal or cultural, national or international levels. Departing from such conceptions Karim attempts to review Islam in Indonesia from the socio-political point of view.

In his elaboration on the Islamic community in Indonesia (Chapter II) Karim highlights Islamic organisations such as, Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI = the Indonesian Council of Ulemas), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, high school and university student organisations, Islamic education, Islamic scholars, Islamic mass media and publications, and last but not least the official government institution, namely the Department of Religious Affairs. It is hoped that upon these pillars Islam would be able to grow in accordance with their conceptual frame of reference, towards the ideals of the Islamic community that is committed to Islam (p. 27). The aspiration after an Islamic community is not an isolated one. It is supported by the fact that a substantial part of the population in Indonesia are followers of the Islamic faith, and that number constitutes the largest Islamic population in the world.

In their effort to achieve the objective concerned the internal Islamic interactions and communications, either within Islamic organisations, or between them, are valued by Karim as not running in a smooth, sincere and reciprocally responsive manner. Socio-cultural factors such as, backwardness, poverty, ignorance, and also individual factors such as, rivalry, differences in disposition, perception and interest, have often hampered the progress of the Islamic community in pursuing their goal. For example, Karim refers to the Department of Religious Affairs. The Department which according to Deliar Noer is to serve the purpose of dealing with religious affairs at the national level, particularly those pertaining to education, information and justice, is basically an institution presented to the Islamic community as a compensation to the demand for the need to incorporate as much as possible, Islamic elements into politics or the government system (p. 47). Through this department the Islamic interests can be elevated to become the official government's interests, in terms of

either law enforcement, funds or scope. This strategic department has since time immemorial become an arena of great competition between two major Islamic forces, particularly the NU and Muhammadiyah. As a result the department that constitutes a miniature form of Indonesian Islamic leadership has eventually become a government apparatus with the most disorderly administration (p. 48) and with a situation mostly in disarray (p.156).

This is also the case with socio-religious organisations such as NU, on the one hand and Muhammadiyah, on the other. It is in these two organisations that the Islamic community daily practises its religion. In this regard NU, which was founded in 1926 and inclined to approximate culture and tradition, is regarded as the most disorderly organisation, giving the impression of being very compromising, which is even more so with regard to the latest situation when this largest religious organisation has accepted Pancasila as its sole principle. On the other hand, NU's accommodative stance is estimated as being NU's strength, since it is from this point that NU has finally been able to formulate its political format on a national scale. Such a stance is questioned by Karim, "NU can only be of any significance if it is able to come to the fore with an image of an organisation that has initiatives and not being one merely seeking harmony and going along with the current." Karim opines that the claim for national integration may as well be used as a criterion so as not to give the impression of being exclusive but, he adds, inherently Islam should remain to function as the criterion and not vice versa (p. 93).

Without that criterion NU will emerge as a radically traditional force, namely radical in terms of organisation, situational in politics and traditional in religion (see Mitsuo Nakamura's opinion cited by Karim on pages 93-94).

Meanwhile Muhammadiyah being an Islamic reformer organisation founded in 1912 which is perhaps the strongest Islamic reformer organisation in the world, is valued by Karim as being inclined to be against culture (p. 163). This organisation is more familiar with the pro-

gress and development of modern sciences of the West, all of which are henceforth projected into the Quran and Al Hadits as their criterion. In the light of the characteristics of mentioned organisations it is apparent that in some cases both organisations do not always run parallel, it is even opined by Karim that the conflict between the two (NU and Muhammadiyah) will never end (p. 163), notwithstanding the new approaches made, which he calls cultural approaches. Based on such organisations, at least nine organisations, comprising those of high school, and university students and the youth, are basically only means for the achievement of a greater objective namely to create an Islamic community based on Islamic ethics (p. 104).

With regard to the tensions occurring within Islam, Karim opines that the presence of MUI (the Indonesian Council of Ulemas) or that of the scholars is very important. MUI serves the purpose of: issuing fatwas (religious decisions) and giving advice to the government on matters relating to the Islamic religion, strengthening Islamic brotherhood and representing Islam in facing other religions, serving as a link between ulemas and the authorities (p. 59). All activities of MUI are those which enables it to cope with and to stand above the frictions within Islam. However, Karim is disappointed with MUI's personnel, who do not as yet carry weight, compared with those of MAWI (Indonesia's Bishops Conference) or PGI (Association of Indonesian Churches). The leadership of such organisations should to a large extent be more engaged in establishing relations with higher educational institutions, and it does not suffice to have a mastery of religion (Islamic) only in order to make the fatwa decisions carry more weight (p. 66).

Meanwhile as regards the moslem scholars (who according to Karim's criterion have to meet six requirements), their number totals only less than 100 out of the 140 million followers. In them lies the hope to unite and revive the Islamic potential in the future (p. 125). It is their task to socialise the values and tenets of Islam. However, they (who generally belong to the modernist faction) are still polarised into young modernists and old ones. Notwithstanding the phenomenon of polarisa-



tion still prevailing here and there, nowadays there seems to emerge a new trend tending towards one goal namely an Islamic society. The combination between the totally universal Islamic conception that has become an expectation on the one hand, and the reality which constitutes a situational manifestation on the other hand, is what has been referred to by Karim as the Islamic dynamism.

However, apparently according to Karim, gradually those endeavours are not without results. The emergence of the Islamisation of the bureaucracy in Indonesia, such as, for example, Yayasan Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila (Charity Foundation of Pancasila Moslems) which actively engages itself in collecting funds through the deduction of civil servants' salaries for the sake of Islam, is one example of the realisation of an Islamic society (p. 131). The efficiency of the bureaucracy for the interest of Islam (Islamisation of the society) is an advancement of inestimatable value to the struggle of Islam. All mentioned activities are launched to arrest secularisation, because according to Karim, it is an attempt to pose religion as one's own affair only (p. 109).

In his view on leadership and politics (Chapter III), Karim opines that Masyumi was the only political party which was really Islamic. However, on account of the party's involvement in the revolt to establish "a Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia," it was disbanded by Soekarno by virtue of Presidential Decision No. 200/1960. The failure to rehabilitate Masyumi (see the statement of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia in December 1960, p. 186), greatly disappointed Islam. This is also the case with the sequence of events that happened thereafter (during the period of the New Order Government) which does not lessen the disappointment. The emergence of Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia = Indonesian Moslem Party) was greatly disfavoured by some quarters of the Islamic community (pp. 189-190).

With the fusion of political parties (PPP = United Development Party is a fusion of Islamic parties) is valued by Karim as a

deliberate attempt to create internal conflicts among the elements in the new party (p. 195). The ulemas who used to be regarded as the bond of the Islamic masses, no longer functioned in the new party system (PPP). Hence, during those years there emerged here and there extremist Islamic movements such as, the Komando Jihad (1977), Front Pembebasan Muslim Indonesia (the Indonesian Moslem Liberation Front, 1977), Perjuangan Revolusi Indonesia (the Indonesian Revolutionary Struggle, 1978) and Dewan Revolusioner Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Revolutionary Council, 1980-1981), and others, all of which had their activities geared towards establishing an Islamic State (p. 201).

The old "wounds" of the disappointment had not recuperated yet, when a new disappointment followed, namely with the event when the decision was taken using Pancasila as the sole principle in the life of the state, nation and society. Karim values the Pancasila issue as the most stirring event giving colour to the Islamic political history during the decade of the 1980s. Because owing to Pancasila as the sole principle, according to Karim, the line connecting religion and statehood has been eliminated (p. 210).

With regard to the aforementioned issue there are at least three kinds of attitude amongst the Islamic community; those who accepted it without reservation, those who accepted it because they were compelled to do so, while waiting for the enactment of the law on social organisations, and those who rejected it on all counts. Belonging to the first group are NU, Persatuan Tarbiyah Islam (Islamic Political Party), and some other small Islamic organisations such as the Dewan Masjid Indonesia and others. What gave rise to a heated debate was the stance of NU, which is known as "accommodationist." NU accepted Pancasila as its sole principle in its Congress in Situbondo at the end of 1984. Another decision, for example, the return of NU to the 1926 Khittah means that NU is no longer a socio-political organisation but is a socio-religious one oriented towards socialisation. In this case the right of politics has been given back to each individual, so that NU members no longer are automat-

ically members of PPP or any other Islamic party. In this regard there are some who opine that such a stand taken by NU was basically a reflection of a desire to be structural in nature, and did not constitute NU's own authentic desire (p. 218). Whereas the second group, for example, the Muhammadiyah, eventually accepted the principle at its congress in Surakarta by the end of 1985. The group totally rejecting it was, for example, HMI (Islamic Students Association), which ultimately after a long process, accepted it at its congress in Padang in March 1986. It was in line with this HMI's stance that there emerged some personal views supporting it from, for example, Deliar Noer, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Yusuf Abdullah Puar, and others. Those personal opinions are likely to remain so since according to Karim, they no longer expect anything from the government or at least are not likely to deal with licences and do not wish to become civil servants (p. 225).

Furthermore, Karim states that as soon as the Pancasila "experiment" as the sole principle was successful, the government was again ready to come up with another package (the package of the Five Bills in the field of politics: general election, social organisations, referendum, political parties and the Functional Group, the composition and position of the People's Consultative Assembly and the House of Representatives). According to Karim the package of Five Bills was not that controversial compared to that of Pancasila as the sole principle. Hence he valued the steps taken by the government as an indication that the present ruling regime has become more daring in keeping Islam away from politics (p. 221). It is in this respect that he sees the government's authority as an irresistible power.

From his reflections, particularly on the condition of Islam lately, Karim has arrived at the conclusion that in terms of politics the Islamic masses are really in a floating condition. This is due to the depolitisation of Islam on the one hand, and the success of the most spectacular secularisation in politics of the New Order (p. 268), on the other. In this context, the return of NU to the 1926 Khittah is regarded by Karim as tearing the face of Islam to

pieces, and at the same time widen the conflicts among various Islamic organisations which accidentally did not choose the same course as that of NU. Such a situation may henceforth minimise the possibility of the integration of the Islamic community, which in turn will rule out the possibility of an Islamic political consolidation (p. 271). This is due to NU's frailty, asserts Karim! Karim also mentions other causes, for example, the internal factor of the poor and backward Islamic community, so as to limit their demand to meeting their basic needs such as food and the like (p. 305). However, the Islamic community is generally not aware of such a condition (p. 161) and is inclined to make a scapegoat to external factors. In such a situation, the Islamic community is very seldom, if ever, introspective of itself (p. 295), moreover in an era of the ever increasing progress of science and technology. And in this respect there might be some truth in what was said by Soedjatmoko, that if religion is unable to formulate the development ideology and cannot learn to exert its great influence upon the masses towards the achievement of the development objective, those religions will be pushed aside (p. 234).

As to Islam in Indonesia, in a situation of ebb and flow, Karim sees a way out through a cultural movement. This movement now being spectacularly launched is in fact intended to socialise Islamic values in families and the community. The roles of Ulemas, intellectuals and businessmen alike are instrumental in that movement. Karim is convinced that through that movement, provided the community is capable of maintaining its social solidarity, Islam will emerge as a selected group (khaira ummah), that will become the prime controller of the course of social transformation in Indonesia. No matter how great and advanced this cultural movement may be, it is considered by Karim as being just at the initial stage. For that movement basically just serves the purpose of balancing the de-institutionalisation of Islamic politics which has happened lately.

Following the themes presented in *Dinamika Islam di Indonesia*, it is conspicuous that Karim is having a dialogue with himself on various affairs he has experienced. In this re-


gard it appears that it is difficult for Karim to detach himself in his views on events related to his religion (Islam), so that his description on Islam tends to become subjective, impulsive and emotional in nature, which is at times confusing -- which will certainly confuse the readers. For example, when Karim discusses the policy of the Minister of Education and Culture of the Third Development Cabinet (pp. 49-50) in the context of the discussion on the Department for Religious Affairs. Here the policies of the Minister of Education and Culture are viewed from a fragmented spectacle. And so is the discussion on Pancasila as the sole Principle in the life of the State and Nation (pp. 204-240, and pp. 263-265). Karim observes that the theme constitutes a uniformity of the parties principle, which is not in line with the consensus reached on 31st December 1969 (p. 250) or with the Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia No. II/MPR/1983 on the Guidelines of State Policy.

Meanwhile in highlighting various matters Karim departs from the concept of Islam as a totality (see Chapter I), and this might be a factor from which the problems he is facing

originate, including the difficulty to accept reality in a natural and flexible manner. Hence his analysis of the events related to Islam, in his train of thoughts has been coloured by his tendency of comparing them with other religions. For example, his discussion on MUI's personnel (p. 66), the Islamic press (pp. 146-147), Islamic publishers (pp. 150-151), Islamisation of a region (p. 161), and the like. In this regard Karim acknowledges that the means of other religions are of better quality such as, those of the Christians and Catholics. Accordingly his description on *Dinamika Islam di Indonesia* viewed from the socio-political aspect tends to ignore the objective and rational frame of reference, taking into consideration the variety of aspects and elements to be found in this pluralist nation. Nevertheless the thoughts presented in this book are really and existentially produced by a young muslim scholar living in Indonesia. It has to be admitted though that such themes are rarely to be found in Indonesia. It is in this respect that the presence of this book will contribute to the understanding of the socio-political reality in Indonesia, particularly one that emerges from the perception of the Islamic interest.

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


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