## CHRONICLE

NOVEMBER

## Internal Affairs

Three main events have dominated the recent political life in Indonesia: the draft of the new marriage bill, the growing student unrest and preparations for the coming PELITA II.

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The draft of the new marriage bill which was submitted by the President aroused widespread reaction, particularly from the Moslem groups. Tension mounted during discussion of the draft by the House of Representatives with demonstrations demanding its total cancellation being launched by Generasi Muda Islam Indonesia and Kesatuan Aksi Umat Islam Indonesia.

To meet the growing tensions Prof. Mukti Ali, the Minister of Religious Affairs, attempted dialogues with various groups while simultaneously the House was collecting views offered by the existing factions i.e. the ABRI faction, Karya Pembangunan and the two political parties, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Indonesia (PPI). The House recommended that the chairmen evaluate all of the collected material between 5—10 November while meanwhile the Deputy Commander of the KOPKAMTIB, Admiral Soedomo, seriously warned that all dissent and criticism was to be addressed through the proper diplomatic channels. He stressed that the government was serious in its attempts to discover the auctor intellectualis of the mounting conflicts, tension and disorder.

In the meantime student unrest had come to the fore, tending day by day to protest action. The major activities stemmed from academic circles on the campus being formulated in a series of intensive discussions organized and conducted by the Student Governments in Jakarta, Bandung and Yogyakarta coupled with various discussions by other groups. These meetings resulted in mounting protest and criticism of the discrientated PELITA I, foreign investment, national leadership, corruption, socialization, the political structure and other related issues. In the beginning a dilemma seemed to exist as to whether or not they ought to take

political action, however, the emerging movement appeared to reach a conclusion with the issue and widespread discussion of an "October 24 Petition" followed by the "Collective Oath of 10 November". The major student issues were to achieve a revision of foreign investment and to have the Personal Assistants to the President (ASPRI) dissolved.

From 5 to 7 November a meeting of the ABRI leaders took place in Jakarta at which a Defence Strategy for 1974 — 1978 was planned and defined. This meeting was soon followed by a special meeting of the KOPKAMTIB on November 7, intended to evaluate and plan its own strategy for the period 1974/75—1978/79. In his address General Soemitro emphasized that social leadership was to be promoted in keeping with the Constitution and the Broad Lines of the State Policy. Such leadership, it was stated, should be openly sensitive and responsive to the problems endured by the population while in addition institutions for continuous social communications were to be spread and multiplied everywhere. Meanwhile General Soemitro had visited several regions and had held discussions with students developing the ideas of the new open communication and leadership which were to become effective as from April 1974.

On November 8, the Chief of National Intelligence announced that counterfeit currency was circulating in Indonesia

On November 14, the Indonesian Contingent to participate in the UNO's security army, Garuda VI, was nominated to leave for the Middle East. As part of the continuing effort to reform the administrative system, Dr. Sumarlin stressed the urgency of re-registering all civil servants, an action which it is planned will be executed by March 1974.

From November 11—22, Drs. J. Pronk, the Dutch Minister of Co-operation for Development made an official visit to Indonesia. Together with official talks he also visited several regions while in Indonesia. Mr. Pronk stated that future aid for Indonesia would depend solely on her requirements, however, he felt that two factors were hindering the programme, namely the misallocation of aid receipts and the conditions of credit. On the management of aid finance, he further stated, this was a matter for Indonesia herself to determine rather than being an area for donating states to dictate.

Politically, according to Mr. Pronk, the Dutch government would not like to decrease the level of aid, however, economically, due particularly to the energy crisis, it was a fact that aid is to be minimised.

On his arrival at the Jakarta airport, on November 11, Mr. Pronk was met by a student group who offered him a memorandum prepared by Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Indonesia. This same memorandum was further offered to him by the Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Rakyat Indonesia in Yogyakarta

On November 17, a discussion with Mr. Pronk was held at the University of Gajah Mada while a similar meeting was held at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta on November 20. On both of these occasions Mr. Pronk stated that the national development of Indonesia was by no means disorientated. Foreign aid did not have to arouse negative influences and it was in fact needed by the developing countries.

From 19 to 21 November a meeting of all provincial governors took place in Jakarta at which special attention was given to the problems of land use planning and rural development. The meeting subsequently issued guidelines for an agrarian policy.

From November 21 through 25, the National Union of Teachers in Indonesia held its conference in Jakarta, with 750 participants from all over the country attending. In his address President Soeharto emphasized the importance of developing human potentials, a goal requiring for its success fundamental reform of the educational system. For the period 1973—1974 6000 primary schools are to be established and 57.600 teachers nominated. It was further stated that the government has shown its sincerity in this field by raising the social condition of teachers. The Conference made several important decisions, including the alteration of fundamental characteristics of the Union, thereby changing it from a Labour-Union into a Professional Association, and the definition of the Teacher's Code of Ethics.

#### Foreign Relations

Mr. Adam Malik's official visit to New Zealand and Australia took place from November 2 to 11. A forum of four states has

been suggested by Mr. Malik, encompassing Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. While in Australia Mr. Adam Malik held several discussions on regional cooperation. He emphasized that Indonesia has been supporting the idea of Asia-Pacific wider regional cooperation, including possibly the Republic of China.

On November 7, Dr. Yeoh Chim Seng, chairman of the Singapore parliament, arrived in Jakarta for his official seven-day visit to Indonesia.

On November 1, General Soemitro opened the first special course of the Institute for National Defence, which was attended by 18 participants from Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.

From 19 to 20 November a conference of the special Committee on an ASEAN Permanent Secretariat was held in Jakarta, to discuss the possible structure and organization of the ASEAN Secretariat.

#### DECEMBER

#### Internal Affairs

Compromises were attempted to meet the growing tensions and conflict over the draft of the new marriage bill including special meetings and dialogues which were arranged day by day. On December 6, a special Committee consisting of 10 members was nominated. President Socharto stressed that the bill should be finally ratified by the end of 1973.

On December 4, 5, 6, a Moslem action, launched by Angkatan Muda Islam, Generasi Muda Islam Indonesia and Kesatuan Aksi Umat Islam, resulted in demonstrations to have the draft completely withdrawn from the scheduled programs of the House.

On December 11 and 19, further action took place in Jakarta, supported by the Komite Kesatuan Nasional Generasi Muda Indonesia, Komite Aksi Generasi Muda Indonesia, the GMNI, the GMKI, the PMKRI, GAMKI, GPM and GSNI, declaring and demanding that the

new bill of marriage necessarily ought to be in keeping with both the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila, while further demanding an enactment of the principle of freedom of religious belief

The mounting disagreement among factions resulted in a quasideadlock of the debate, with the overall situation tending to reach. Thus critical level to avoid further conflict and disorder and to ensure stability, the House suggested that the original draft of the bill, submitted by the Government, be ratified with several small modifications. On December 22, the bill was finally ratified. On the same day President Soeharto instructed that implementative ordinances should soon be drawn up.

The student protest seemed to gather intensity, reaching into programs of political actions with criticism of the social situation, national leadership, on the failures of planning and of the PELITA I, being among the main themes. They provoked for political change and social revolution while intensifying communications among the student world in order to consolidate opinion.

On December 18, the students convoked an 'Apel Kebulatan Tekad' in Jakarta, declaring that the University of Indonesia was to take the lead of a social movement believing patience to be no longer tolerable.

On December 24, the students went to the Bina Graha, to the State Secretariat and to President Socharto's residence at Cendana, however, they failed to meet the President. The Government soon officially announced (on December 27) that the President was prepared to see and have a dialogue with the students after January 7, 1974.

From December 28, student activities were mainly directed at preparing for the dialogue with the President with approximately 14 proposals and problematics being collected, however, dissent among the students themselves seemingly began to emerge at this time.

On December 31, New Year's Eve, Holy Hour Programmes were held participated in by more than 1000 students in Jakarta with similar activities taking place in Yogyakarta.

In the meantime, Admiral Soedomo, the Deputy Commander of the KOPKAMTIB, on December 10, stressed that up to this time the government had been adopting an educative approach to the

mounting student protest, however, he further seriously warned the students not to create violence, destruction or any type of criminality.

General Panggabean also delivered a warning on December 13, emphatically stressing that the ordinances which prohibit demonstrations were still operative.

In evaluating the situation, Major General Ali Moertopo stated that three distinctions were to be made among the demonstrators: first, there were students motivated by pure intention; secondly, there were students motivated by certain political interests, while the third category consisted of those who were no longer students.

There were several groups constituting the extra-campus movement. Next to the actions organised by the existing Student Government which had its headquarters on the campus, there were various other groups, such as GEMIRI, GMII, Angkatan Muda Opposisi, KNPI, GDUI, KAK, KKN and the like.

Nearing the end of 1973 the main issues of the student protest were: reforming the strategy of development, creating greater and more equal socialisation, changing the national leadership and reforming the political structure, mitigating foreign investment especially that from Japan, and dissolving the ASPRI. Radical action appeared to be preferred.

From November 29 up to December 1, the Indonesian Journalist Association (PWI), held its 15th national conference in East Java. President Soeharto, in his address, emphasized that the right of dissent had its origin in the democratic character and in the critical attitude, these, however, were to be founded upon truthfulness and objectivity. The double communication system was urgently needed, said the President. The conference issued several decrees concerning the importance of journalist education, the responsible freedom of the press and the communication system between the press and the government. Meanwhile the conference also held serious discussions on the emerging paper crisis.

On December 7, a meeting was held between Dr. Makagiansar, the Director General of Education and the Commission IX of the House of Representatives, to discuss the policy of education in Indonesia.

On December 27 and 29, a plenary session of the cabinet took place to discuss two main problems: programmes of the REPELITA II and the State Budget for 1974—1975.

Mr. Mashuri, the Minister of Information, explained four main conclusions taken by the cabinet meeting:

- 1. On the assumptions and objectives of PELITA II: they are to be grafted from the Broad Lines of the State Policy. The PELITA II was part of a process of national development, it ought to be a continuation of the PELITA I and a further preparation for the PELITA III. The financing of the programmes were to be based on the balanced-budget principle, while the main objectives of PELITA II are: to get sufficient food and clothing which ordinary people can afford to buy; an improvement of the housing system, employment opportunities, the creation of better infrastructure etc.
- 2. The proposed State Budget of 1974—1975 was an implementative programme of the first year of the PELITA II.
- 3. In keeping with the principle of dialogue and communication, the President had instructed all Departments and government institutions to accept all evaluations for the betterment of the PELITA II.
- 4. In time of an energy crisis such as these days, the government has invited the public to use oil sparingly.

On the eve of the New Year, President Soeharto delivered a state address. He emphatically stressed the significant importance of the year 1973 which he felt had been a year of evaluation. Analysing the general situation in Indonesia, the President gave these following notes:

1. In Internal Politics: this year (1973) the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) had succeeded in defining the Broad Lines of the State Policy and had elected the President and the Vice-President. To meet the constitutional demands, political institutions such as the DPA, the MA and the BPK had been installed and become functional. With Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as exceptions, all reforms and changes are available, with the condition that these ought to keep to the rules of the game as defined by the Constitution.

- 2. On Foreign Policy: Indonesia has gained positive recognition in the international world. Our capacity to manage internal problems give greater confidence to the international world. Indonesia ought to promote greater solidarity and cooperation with all neighbouring countries.
- 3. On the existing criticism: The mounting criticism, offered by the students, has shown that social responsibility has its place in Indonesia. Especially from the younger generation. However, democracy is not to be identified with criticism. The government will always welcome all sound criticism.
- 4. On the Economy: The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) has already decreed how the economic problems in Indonesia are to be solved. The main economic policy is directed at maintaining economic stability. There have been several factors, having their impact on our economic situation, such as: the food-crisis of the world, the world monetary crisis, the energy crisis etc. Indonesia's exports have been increased. There have been about 1500 national and 650 foreign investment projects in Indonesia.
- 5. On mational security: The President explained that the remaining forces of the 30 September Movement (G-30-S) were practically wiped out, however, they continue to attempt to destroy us through subversive actions.
- 6. On Education: the Government decided to build up 6000 primary schools throughout Indonesia, providing them with the required numbers of teachers, spreading books and other educational facilities.

#### Foreign Relations

The 15th IGGI Conference was held in Amsterdam from 11 through 12 December. Indonesia has received 850 million US dollars for the period of 1974—1975.

The SCCAN - Conference took place in Bandung, led by Mr. Radius Prawiro. The conference agreed upon the establishment of

two groups to direct ASEAN trade and to manage ASEAN trade relations with the EEC.

Mr. Norman Kirk, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, arrived in Jakarta to begin his visit which extended from 13 to 18 December. The main objectives of the visit were to promote closer cooperation between Indonesia and New Zealand and to examine the possibility of South Pacific Sub-Regional Cooperation.

Mr. Maori Kiki concurrently the Defence Minister and Foreign Minister of Papua New Guinea, arrived at Jakarta for a five-day visit, from 15 to 20 December. While from 26 to 29 December, Tengku Abdulrachman, the Secretary General of the International Islam Organisation, stayed in Jakarta to invite President Soeharto to participate in the Summit Conference of Islamic States to be held in Pakistan from 22—23 of February 1974.

#### JANUARY

#### Internal Affairs

While tension resulting from the conflict over the marriage bill eased in this period, student protests tended to reach its climax. While in the meantime growing attention was being shown to preparation of the PELITA II, particularly after the President's speech on January 7.

On January 7, 1974, President Soeharto submitted to the House of Representatives a bill on the 1974—75 State Budget together with a draft of PELITA II. The budget was to be balanced at a level of 1577 billion rupiahs representing an increase of 82.9% over the previous period. The bill is divided into routine (960 billion rupiahs) and developmental (615.7 billion rupiahs) expenditures, the latter of which is intended to finance development programmes according to set priorities. The increased routine expenditure is meant to cover higher government employee salaries with particular emphasis being given to those of school teachers. 96 billion has been allocated for agriculture and the irrigation system, 9 billion for industry and mining, 6 billion for

employment and transmigration, 9.6 billion for promoting religious affairs and 53.5 billion for education and culture.

The draft of the PELITA II, known as REPELITA II, covers thirty chapters divided into four major parts, the first of which is on the main policy of national development, the second on financing national development, the third on sectors of national development with the fourth part specifically dealing with regional development planning of the provinces.

Through PELITA II it is expected that national production will increase by 7.5% representing an increase of 5.2% in per capita income providing that the population grows at only 2.3% a year during the period. By the end of PELITA II it is expected that 82.3% of the total development expenditure will be afforded by domestic revenue.

From the total development expenditure during the PELITA II 1.001.6 billion rupiahs will be allocated to the agricultural sector, 930.6 billion for regional development, 848.7 billion for transportation and tourism, 525.8 billion for education, 370.8 billion for electric installations, 192.1 billion for health and family planning, 185 billion for industrial development and 69.4 billion for employment and transmigration.

In general, PELITA II is to be directed at greater socialization while at the same time education is to be promoted in line with the demands of national development. The President has once again invited wider public participation in an effort to add some notes and corrections to the draft which is to be ratified by April 1974.

On January 11, a dialogue was held between the President and the students at the Bina Graha. State Secretary Soedharmono explained that all views and recommendations offered by the students would be taken seriously by the President in keeping with his function as the Mandatary of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR).

The students' demands appeared to centre around the following issues: that national development should be imbued with greater social justice and welfare aspirations, prices should be patterned according to the buying capacity of the people, corruption should

be wiped out, and political functions and organizations should be structured according to the 1945 Constitution.

However, the dialogue did not appear to satisfy the students. Criticism of government policy and its attitude to foreign investment were growing more radical and intensive, with Japanese investment and the ASPRI becoming the main tactical targets of the student protests.

On January 14, after a meeting with the President, General Panggabean decided that the student-protests had already emerged as rebellious actions. He stressed that the President had given full authority to the Armed Forces to take all necessary action to maintain security and order.

Meanwhile on January 3, President Soeharto had called General Soemitro, Lieutenant General Sutopo Yuwono, Major General Soedjono Hoemardani and Major General Ali Moertopo, to a meeting with him. After the talks, General Soemitro refuted the growing claims over his ambition to create a new social leadership. e further refuted the widely rumoured tensions and conflicts existing between some generals close to the President.

On January 14, Admiral Soedomo in a press-conference made an appeal to the students and to all social forces not to encourage demonstrations or other social movements, however, the arrival of the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Tanaka, seemed to be a D-day for radical action. Marking the beginning of radical social action.

By January 15, the situation in Jakarta has become increasingly critical. The students planned demonstrations and attempted to reach the palace where a meeting was being held between President Soeharto and Mr. Tanaka, however, this attempt failed, due to a heavy army guard. The students then marched towards Trisakti University, where they held a mass rally. Meanwhile violence and burnings began to take place in various parts of Jakarta with buildings and cars being burned by the mob. While the action was mainly directed at the PT Astra International Inc. offices and at Toyota cars, some blindly destructive actions seemed to take place also: One of the central marketing places was also burned causing great losses to the population. Mr. Adam Malik and General Panggabean, attempted to meet the mob as also did General Soemitro. The situation became increasingly critical with main roads

in Jakarta soon being mastered by the army. In the afternoon of January 15 a curfew was announced by General Mantik while the armed forces were sent to ensure order and security. An order to shoot the mob on the spot had been issued, if this was felt necessary to prevent anarchic actions of violence, burnings and burglary. In the meantime the Moslem Student Union (HMI) had declared its condemnation on the actions while the Golkar also issued a statement, pledging its support for President Socharto.

By January 16, order still had not been fully restored. Tension still dominated public life while sporadic demonstrations and burnings continued to take place. Schools and Universities were closed and the economic life of Jakarta was totally handicapped. Several arrests began to be executed and some newspapers were banned.

On January 17, a limited cabinet meeting was held by the President. Mr. Mashuri, the Minister of Information, gave the following statement after the meeting:

- 1. The Government deeply regrets the situation, known as January 15 Affair (Peristiwa 15 Januari), which tended to violence and burnings, as degrading to the image of Indonesia and arousing scepticism toward the existing national leadership.
- 2. The Government will take resolute steps to safeguard democratic life from attempts to manipulate democratic principles.
- 3. Mutual understanding among the Government, the House of Representatives and the existing social forces, is to be promoted.
- 4. Those who are involved and especially the planners and instigators of the mounting radicalism, violence, burnings and burglary, will be arrested and legally prosecuted.
- 5. The Government is to restore the economic stability, especially in Jakarta.

Several newspapers and weeklies, considered to be involved in the mounting protest and radical activities and arousing social disintegration and unrest, were delicenced, i.e. Nusantara, Indonesia Raya, Harian Kami, Abadi, The Jakarta Times, Pemuda Indonesia, Wenang, Pedoman, Express and Mingguan Mahasiswa Indonesia.

It has been estimated that 13 were killed, 128 injured, around 870 cars and 187 motorcycles (the large majority being Japanese) were burned, and various buildings damaged.

On January 19, Admiral Soedomo, together with Mr. Ali Sadikin, the Governor of Jakarta, briefed all school-principals in Jakarta. Admiral Soedomo explained the background situation of the January 15 Affair. Schools were to be opened by January 21, with the exception of several schools in Jakarta. All universities were to remain closed.

In the meantime the Defence Ministry issued formal information stating that a number of people had been arrested, however, he added that people are not expected to be disturbed, as those who are proved innocent will soon be freed. In the meantime Major General Ali Moertopo explained that as a result of interrogations, it had been found that the situation appeared to have been planned by the ex-PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) and the ex-Masyumi members.

On January 17, the government officially announced that Prof. Oemar Senoadji had been nominated Chief of the Supreme Court while Prof. Dr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja was to become the Minister of Justice, and Prof. Dr. Syarif Thayeb Minister of Education and Culture.

On January 21, the Defence and Security Minister, General Panggabean, addressed the plenary session of the House of Representatives. General Panggabean gave a chronological exposition of the January 15 Affair. The following were some of his main proposals:

- 1. The President of the Republic of Indonesia is elected and nominated by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). In a case where the President has violated the broad lines of the state policy, the House of Representatives has the right to convoke a MPR's general assembly.
- 2. It is up to the President to nominate Ministers and Assistants.
- 3. Rebellious actions are prohibited and will be crushed by the Armed Forces

A consensus has been affirmed between the government and the House of Representatives, in which the Defence Minister's basic

proposals were fully accepted. In the meantime the House also issued comments and evaluations on the January 15 Affair from all factions. The House also began discussing the proposed state budget and the draft of the REPELITA II.

On the occasion of the manguration of the new Ministers and the Chief of the Supreme Court, on January 22, President Soeharto emphasized that the 15 January Affair found its origin in the irresponsible practice of democracy. He stated that democracy had been so manipulated that its results were mere burnings and violence, causing damages to the population. The government has the responsibility to take determined actions to safeguard democratic principles. The resolute actions of the government should not therefore be interpreted as the beginning of a decline of democracy.

Immediately after the inaugurations, the Minister of Education and Culture was confronted by the duty to restore University life. A meeting of University rectors in Indonesia was held in Jakarta, to define academic freedom, especially its implementation in Indonesia. They were informed that the government had no intention of abolishing academic freedom, however, such freedom should be exercised with great responsibility, and always be distinguished from mere issues.

The student protests seemingly subsided, however, the situation was still characterised by uncertainty and unrest. To assist in dispelling this doubt, President Soeharto, on January 28, held a meeting with the Golkar's leaders and the leaders of the two political parties. The President expected these three social forces to give their response and evaluation on the proposed PELITA II.

On the same day an official announcement declared that to meet the demand of security and order, President Soeharto will take over the Command of the KOPKAMTIB with Admiral Soedomo as Chief of Staff while General Soemitro will retain his post as Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces. The institution of the ASPRI was dissolved, Major General Ali Moertopo retained his post at the BAKIN, while Major General Soedjono Humardani remained and always was a member of the House of Representatives and the MPR.

On January 22, the Council for Economic Stability held its meeting, and issued three main decrees: on the pattern of hidup sederhana, on efforts to promote indigenous entrepreneurs, and on prohibiting the import of built-up cars.

#### FEBRUARY

On February 4, 1974, a Council for Political Stability and Security was installed by President Soeharto with the function of managing matters related to politics and security. There has then been two councils installed: one for economic stability and the other for political stability and security.

A meeting of all provincial governors was held in Jakarta. Addressing the conference, on February 6, President Soeharto expounded the following guidelines:

- 1. On the importance of the conference: "This conference has its special importance, particularly as the REPELITA II is going to be implemented by April 1974. This meeting is therefore the last preparation for the coming PELITA II". The President further explained the significance and objectives of national development stating that national development is to be understood as a continuous effort
- 2. On evaluating REPELITA I: The President further explained, that he had already offered and had accepted his account of the REPELITA I in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) as defined in the MPR's decree no. III/1973. It had therefore to be understood that notwithstanding all shortcomings, the MPR had already given constitutional ratification to his account of the PELITA I.
- 3. On the objectives of the REPELITA II: The President explained that there are five main objectives of the REPELLTA II. Those five main objectives are to be considered as national goals. These, however, are to be adapted to regional conditions and development. There are special sectors which ought to be given more attention in the PELITA II, such as employment opportunities, redistribution of income, developing transmigration, socialization of welfare etc.
- 4. Five characteristics of REPELITA II: There are five characteristics of the coming PELITA II, said the President.
  These are:

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1. That the REPELITA II is the continuation of the REPELITA II the LITA I. That is the reason why in the REPELITA II the economic sector is still given the first priority.

- 2. As a continuation of the REPELITA I, the coming REPELITA II should develop several improvements on the elapsed PELITA I. In particular this means achieving more balanced and harmonious development, such as between economic and social problems. National development is to be patterned with popular characteristic, i.e. it must be orientated to the population.
- The third characteristic of the PELITA II, is that it ought to create a harmonious balance between the dimensions of: progress and justice. The PELITA II is to be directed to greater socialization, while at the same time it is not to be understood as creating an inimical climate for the growing entrepreneurship. Naturally we must also be aware: that capitalism is to be avoided, however, to achieve social. development a great number of people are needed who are capable of managing capital. Socialization is not to be understood as choosing a miserable way of life as the main way of life. Socialization means rationality and social solidarity. This will imply problems of communication between the "haves and the have not", on indigenous and nonindigenous groups, investment problems etc. This is the reason why in the REPELITA II a large allocation has been made to achieve regional development.
- 4. The fourth characteristic of the PELITA II is its greater attention to the management of natural resources and environment.
- 5. The fifth characteristic of the PELITA II will be the promotion of a strong governmental apparatus.

The President further mentioned the problems of leadership stating that the state administrative system would prove a major infrastructural component for development and therefore government officials must develop the capacity to promote social participation.

The President also touched upon the January 15 Affair stating that it was a real setback for the New Order.

The President reminded the provincial governors of the essentialia of the New Order, which is basically directed at the authentic implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. This implies an avoidance of all the ways and approaches which are not in keeping with the spirit and operative principles as defined by the 1945 Constitution. Extremism and radicalism are not found in the vocabulary of the 1945 Constitution.

National development basically implies reform and change, however, we must promote planned social changes as radical and anarchic social changes will only cause damage to the population. The 15 January Affair has been a concrete example of such action, indeed behind that affair, were those who hoped to achieve their goals by force operating through radical, anarchic, destructive means, indeed manipulating the very principles of democracy.

"As a mandatary of the MPR", said the President, "I have the responsibility to restore order and security, to get national development materialized, to get the constitutional life implemented. The 15 January Affair has been an absolute setback for us. But we should not be terrified".

The President further explained the dual communication system which he has promoted. It was pointed out by the President that the 1945 Constitution provided us with institutions for communication. Finally the President gave five recommendations to meet the situation in these days and here after, namely: to get all social forces unified; to prepare and be aware of efforts and attempts from those who aim at creating national desintegration, breaking political stability into pieces, retarding the process of national development, altering the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution; to seriously persevere in working for social progress and development; to get wider and more active social participation; to promote mutual understanding and cooperation amongst government officials: between central and the local government and between military and non-military officials.

## Foreign Relations

In the midst of anti-Japanese-investment action and of violence and burnings, Mr. Tanaka spent a three-day visit in Indonesia.

Official talks were held between President Soeharto and Mr. Tanaka, the two readers of state announcing a common statement on the promotion of stronger friendship and cooperation between the two countries based on the principle that Japan will not violate the freedom of the Southeast Asian States, and that she will help those states to promote national development without attempting to retard progress towards economic autonomy. President Soeharto expressed his deepest appreciation for Japanese aid to Indonesia during the period of PELITA I. The President further suggested that foreign investment ought to be labour-extensive in character, and that attempts be made to promote the managerial skill of the Indonesian people. In the meantime the President also explained the Nusantara-principle.

On January 16, at a press-conference in Bina Graha, Mr. Tanaka explained that the volume of Japanese-Indonesian trade amounted to two billion US dollars for the period of 1973, while the total volume of Japanese foreign trade in that period amounted at approximately, 90 billion US dollars. Mr. Tanaka explained his resolute intention to promote friendship and cooperation between the two countries. A new policy on investment seemed to have to be defined by Japan.

From January 23 through 27, the Dutch Foreign Minister, Mr. Max van der Stoel paid an official visit to Indonesia.

On 11 and 12 January a meeting of the ASEAN Secretary Generals was held in Bangkok to evaluate recommendations proposed by the meeting of the Special Committee in Bandung.

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### ACTIVITY OF THE CENTRE

FIRST JAPANESE - INDONESIAN CONFERENCE

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December 6 — 10, 1973

CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES.

PROGRAMME

First Part 

JAPAN - INDONESIAN RELATIONS IN THE 70'S

Jakarta, December 6 — 8, 1973

General Introduction on Major General

RELATIONS IN

THE SEVENTIES

JAPAN-INDONESIAN Soedjono HOEMARDANI

JAPAN-INDONESIAN

COOPERATION IN

THE CONTEXT OF PEACE

AND STABILITY IN ASIA

General SOEMITRO

Ambassador Nobuhiko USHIBA

CONVERGENCE AND

DIVERGENCE OF JAPAN'S

AND INDONESIA'S

INTEREST AND

RESPONSIBILITY IN

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Major General Ali MOERTOPO

Prof. Fuji KAMIYA

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