

REVIEW OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Changing Landscape of Political Mapping

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Indonesia's political map has become increasingly volatile in the first quarter of 2013. More than one year before the 2014 general election, the constellation of political parties and political elite's power fluctuate akin to changes in a stock market. These changes are caused by dynamics of calculated maneuvering by the political elite, as well as incidents and "accidents" such as the multiple graft scandals experienced by the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in the last few months.

Heading for the 2014 Election

The Big Parties

The decline of the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat)'s electability since 2012 was also primarily brought about by the score of cases involving high-ranking party officials. This is seen by the other parties as an opportunity to strengthen their own party's electability and grab Partai Demokrat's debris by attempting to catch swing voters leaving Partai Demokrat. The decision by Election Commission (KPU) of only admitting ten parties to compete for the 2014 election in February (two

other parties were admitted later), increasingly ensured the concentration of voters towards several relatively dominant parties.

The only new party that has passed the verification tests by the Commission is the National Democratic Party (Nasdem). Other than Nasdem, the other nine parties are those that already have representatives at the House of Representatives (DPR); Partai Demokrat, PDI-P, Golkar, Gerindra, Hanura, the National Mandate Party (PAN), PPP, PKB, and PKS, all of them have met the minimum requirement (threshold).

Nasdem party - empowered by two media moguls: Surya Paloh (Metro TV and Media Indonesia) and Harry Tanoesoedibyo (MNC, RCTI, Sindo Newspaper) - was initially estimated to seize great gains ahead of the 2014 elections. With corruption cases of incumbent parties unfolding one after the other over the past year, the drastic decline of the Democratic Party, and the media power of the two top high ranking officials, we can expect that the Nasdem party will have enough power to make strong inroads to the national political market in the 2014 elections.

Presidential and vice presidential candidates who were in the market for the year 2012 are mostly still old faces. The only candidate whose electability has significantly increased is Prabowo. In 2012 CSIS's national survey, respondents who claimed they would vote for Prabowo was 14.5% which was a whopping 7.8% increase from CSIS' earlier survey.¹ If respondents were asked with an aid of photographs, Prabowo stands even stronger with 17.9% of the respondents planning to vote for him.²

On the other hand, Prabowo's party, Gerindra, remains at a solid range around 5 percent.³ Gerindra has so far only slightly increased their electability from the votes it attained in the last 2009 elections at 4.46 percent.

At the beginning of 2013, the constellation of the existing political forces were relatively stable and can be mapped rather more clearly. Each party has a voting power that can be estimated, and the bigger

¹ CSIS National Survey, 2012.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid. When asked on top of mind which party they would choose, 5.4 percent respondents answered Gerindra.

parties in particular already have presidential candidates many expected to be presented to the public. Political turmoil in various forms, however, emerged and changed these political constellations quite drastically.


Last year, the constellation of party strength was still not very far off from the results of the 2009 election. This year, there have been fluctuations primarily due to the dissipating popularity of Partai Demokrat since last year, resulting in Partai Demokrat losing a lot of its appeal to voters. It is estimated that they are losing more than half of its voters. Golkar and Gerindra seemed to be the primary beneficiaries of this shift where the two parties gained significant increases as of the survey. It is also observed as "new order nostalgia", a phenomenon where Indonesian citizens seem to reminisce the perceived stability under the New Order. Golkar and Gerindra under Prabowo are symbols of this bygone era. Other parties, except PDI-P, seem to be also on the decline for various reasons; primarily, apathy towards politics seem to be the main reason.

The main new contender to be expected changing some part of the constellation was Nasdem, which was foreseen to ground a considerably strong position. Nasdem party, however, was hit by an internal friction. The tension between Surya Paloh and Hary Tanoesoedibyo broke the core of the party, as Tanoesoedibyo stepped out of the party after Surya Paloh became chairman, and thousands of Nasdem cadres from various areas also resigned alongside Tanoesodibyo. All vigorous Nasdem ads on television and media belonging to Tanoesoedibyo (Sindo, MNC, RCTI) vanished instantly.⁴

In a relatively short period, Tanoesodibyo made a decision to join the People's Conscience Party (Hanura) under the leadership of Wiranto, the smallest party in Parliament today. Hanura began actively recruiting ex Nasdem cadres. Hanura's recruitment started to become more active and attempted the old 'celebrity formula' by recruiting popular singer Kris Dayanti, who joined the party in mid-February. On the other hand, a senior politician from Hanura, Akbar Faisal resisted the stream of movement and joined the Nasdem instead.

⁴ "Harry Tanoe Mundur, Iklan Nasdem di MNC Group Dihentikan," *Kompas.com*, 21 January 2013. Available in <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/01/21/15331618>


Figure 1. Votes gained by parties in the 2009 Election vs. the tentative strength of political parties based on a CSIS survey in 2012.



This political constellation based on seats attained by parties during the 2009 election seem more likely to not change drastically as shown by the comparison above. The main shift will be the seats from Demokrat (PD) to be distributed to the other parties. Tentatively, the primary beneficiaries of Demokrat's floundering would be Gerindra and Golkar based on the survey. The other seats will likely go also to the newcomers for the 2014 election: Nasdem, PBB, PKPI.

Nevertheless, based on the previous survey, the political balance of power will most likely not change drastically. The major parties remain: Golkar, PDI-P, Demokrat with Gerindra possibly closing in to join the 'big boys' club. Meanwhile all the other contestants will be secondary powers with varying degrees of strength, but generally expected to be below 5% in votes, and also most likely also in terms of seats in the parliament (see Figure 1).

Figure 2. Parliament seats based on the 2009 Election



The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), on the other hand, experienced the largest party scandal so far. PKS president, Luthfi Hasan Ishaq, was involved in the bribery case of a beef import quota.⁵ This corruption scandal has become more rambunctious due to the involvement of a female student in the process of a transaction by Ahmad Fathonah, a trustee of Luthfi.⁶ This case tarnished PKS' image even more due to the contrast to the moral slogans which had been PKS' self proclaimed core of the party. This could be said to be the biggest party scandal so far, as it implicated the head of a party with an arrest and declaration as suspect that was very quick compared to other cases. In addition to this graft case, another case looms on the horizon, a fertilizer case also involving of PKS cadres.

Golkar, which has been generally solid, showed signs of an internal rift. It has been touted that the chairman of Golkar, Aburizal Bakrie, will be the party's main presidential candidate. However, there had been rumors of attempts to unseat him, as rejections to Bakrie's appointment as presidential candidate started to be voiced out.⁷ A senior Golkar figure and leader, Agung Laksono, was rumored to be the motor of the faction attempting to overthrow Bakrie.

⁵ "Beef Graft Suspect Charged with Money Laundering," *The Jakarta Post*, 8 March 2013.

⁶ "KPK Questions Student in Beef Graft Scandal," *The Jakarta Post*, 7 March 2013.

⁷ "Senior Golkar Members Move to Oust Aburizal," *The Jakarta Post*, 7 March 2013.

The Lapindo mudflow case also remains a major financial burden for Bakrie, who still has to pay compensation to the victims of the mud in the area. More importantly, the Lapindo case has become an Achilles heel to Aburizal Bakrie in the context of public's perception of him. The association of Lapindo with the Bakrie name has long tarnished his public image and is still weakening its reputation. Meanwhile, Bakrie's financial strength had seemed to decline quite significantly after a dispute between Bakrie and Nathaniel Rothschild, a British businessman in relation to the efforts by Rothschild to control Bumi plc's financial position.⁸ Overlaps of these tensions in business and politics can also be detected in this case where Hashim Djojohadikusumo, the older brother of Prabowo, became Rothschild associate in the fight against Bakrie to control the board of Bumi plc.

Partai Demokrat continues to be beleaguered by corruption cases and internal friction that had been increasingly more and more transparent to the public. In January, the Minister of Youth and Sports Andi Malarangeng, who is also one of the people closest to the president, resigned after being named suspect in the corruption case of the Hambalang sports complex. Meanwhile, an internal turmoil between the then party chairman Anas Urbaningrum and President Yudhoyono, who is also the chairman of the Executive Board of Partai Demokrat, meliorated after the dismissal of the chairman in communication, Ruhut Situmpul, who is an SBY loyalist and very critical of Urbaningrum. The rift marked a first clearer sign of an increasingly open warfare between the two camps.

The investigation of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in the Hambalang case, and subsequently Urbaningrum's status in the investigation, became a source of battlefield between the two camps. Prior to the declaration of Urbaningrum as a suspect, many observers suspected that he kept certain secrets regarding the flow of illegal funds to those close to President SBY, which serve as his 'ace card' to cover his back. The heat of the conflict continued to rise until February when it was all out in the open. Coming home from a state visit to Europe, Yudhoyono gave rise to an integrity pact and demanded it to be signed by the cadres of the Democrat Party. One of the key points in

⁸ "Bakrie Out of Rich Men's Club," *The Jakarta Post*, 30 November 2012.

the pact was that "if any cadre is lodged in a legal case they have to resign from their post," which was the initial step to force Urbaningrum to resign from chairmanship. Not long afterwards, an order of investigation that was issued by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) regarding the pronouncement of Urbaningrum as a suspect in the Hambalang case was leaked to the media. The leakage was interpreted as a pressure for Urbaningrum to resign. Finally in mid-March, Urbaningrum was declared suspect and immediately threatened to uncover bigger cases. Not long after the, Ibas Yudhoyono, who was also the secretary-general of the party, resigned from his position as a member of the House of Representatives (DPR).

The series of events proved that suspicions concerning political cartels in the government and parliament had been quite extensive. The flow of corruption funds splattered to various sides that work together despite competition and sometimes hostilities between political parties, and also tensions within political parties. Nevertheless, positive developments can be expected from revelations from these big cases. It may be the first signs of the crack within the current political cartels.

The Smaller Parties

Meanwhile, a number of parties that did not pass the KPU verification part were seen to join the bigger parties that qualified for the election. While two others managed to circumvent the KPU's decision through other channels. Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI) led by the former governor of Jakarta, Sutiyoso, got the green light from the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) to participate in the 2014 elections. Eventually PKPI continued to challenge KPU's decision to the State Administrative Court after Bawaslu's decision to pass PKPI was rejected by the KPU. Meanwhile the Crescent Star Party (PBB), led by Yusril Ihza Mahendra, immediately obtained verification through a lawsuit against the KPU at the State Administrative Court.

Interestingly, a number of figures who were involved in political cases in the past years still tried to get back on the political stage. Susno Duadji, a former police general awaiting the process of serving a sentence in a corruption case, joined the PBB. Aceng Fikri, the former Garut Regent who was impeached because of a marriage scandal, tried to become a legislative representative of Hanura. These efforts

were met with strong objections from the Srikandi Hanura, which is the women's wing within Hanura.

Local elections

A number of local elections that took part in the first quarter of 2013 were all in areas with large population, therefore considered strategic. West Java gubernatorial elections became a competition ground to five pairs, with three strongest candidates: Ahmad Heryawan - Deddy Mizwar (supported by PKS); Dede Yusuf - Lex laksamana (Partai Demokrat and Gerindra); and Rieke Dyahpitaloka - Teten Masduki (PDI-P). The election was animated by the presence of Joko Widodo, the popular governor of Jakarta who lent support for the pair Rieke - Teten. The checkered-shirt symbol and Joko Widodo's support became a particular "political franchise" that was interesting to observe. The heated election was eventually won by incumbent Ahmad Heryawan, albeit with a fairly thin margin of victory with 33.19 percent of the votes. Rieke-Teten came in second, with 27.5 percent of the votes, and the third was the previously favored candidate, Dede Yusuf, who acquired 25.43 percents of the votes.

Meanwhile, the local election in North Sumatra was eagerly discussed and also considered strategic because of the relatively large population of the province. It was won by the pair Gatot Pujo Nugroho - Erry Nuradi, who were supported by PKS, Hanura, and Partai Patriot and received 33 percents of the votes.

Aside from being strategic due to the large population of the provinces, another noteworthy feature of these two elections was the large number of non-voters or those that did not vote, known as *golongan putih* (golput). In the North Sumatra election, the number of voters using their rights to vote was only 5,001,438 of the 10,310,872 eligible voters in the permanent voters list (DPT), which is only a bit more than half. In the West Java election, more than 11 millions of the 32.5 million voters in the list of DPT did not use their rights to vote, which is about 37 percent. The high number of absentees was attributed to the public being fed up with existing political issues.⁹

⁹ A. Chaedar Alwasilah, "Lessons from Regional Elections: In Political Parties We Do Not Trust," *The Jakarta Post*, 20 April 2013.

In both elections, the runner-ups, Rieke-Teten in West Java and Effendy Simbolon-Djumiran Abdi in North Sumatra, did not acknowledge the end result.¹⁰ They alleged cheating and unfairness in both elections and brought the case to the Constitutional Court. Meanwhile, PKS claimed that the victory for the two pairs PKS had supported in both elections (Heryawan-Jabar, and Nugroho - North Sumatra) proved that the party still had the mass support amid the national scandals it had suffered from. However, at a glance, it was obvious that the party was not a major factor in both elections, as each candidate's "success team" paid more attention to individual factors over the party in the mass media news release.

State-Society Relations: The Mass Organization Bill

Dynamics of state-society relations is one of the interactions in Indonesia's democracy in which a balance is still calibrated. Laws and regulations concerning great arbitrary powers in the hands of the government tend to be shunned due to fears that the authoritarian practices of the New Order might return. In the last few years, the Mass Organization bill has generated much discourse in the House of Representatives. The Mass Organization Law (*UU Ormas*) Number 5 (1985) had long been considered incompatible with the development of Indonesia's democracy since the reform era, which has led to the preparation of the recently-revised Mass Organization bill.

The bill is generating much controversy in the debate among civil society. One of the main objections is the clause in the bill that regulates that registered mass organizations must include Pancasila as one of its main principles. In short, mass organizations are not allowed to reject the principle of Pancasila. Those who circumvent the rules are given a warning up to three times, and if they still do not heed the warnings, they can be frozen and dissolved through court decisions.¹¹

In this unique circumstance, for once, non-governmental organizations from civil society and conservative religious organizations (for example Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia and Da'wah Council) were unanimous in their circumstance against the passage of the bill. A Coalition on the Freedom of Association (KBB) expressed its objection against

¹⁰ "Court Reject Rieke's W. Java Election Lawsuit," *The Jakarta Post*, 1 April 2013.

¹¹ "Govt Says 'Ormas' Bill to Be Passed Next," *The Jakarta Post*, 23 March 2013.

that bill. The disclaimer is based on fear of control by the government akin to the New Order regime. Conservative religious groups' rejection on the basis of restricted freedom of association and expression is however an unusual jargon used by those groups.

State-Religion Dynamics

Dynamics of the relations between states and religion continued to show certain tension and confusions throughout the first quarter of 2013, as discrimination and repression against religious minorities continued to exist. Discrimination and repression occurred both horizontally and vertically. Closure and sealing of houses of worship and other activities often become vertical discrimination by local governments, also driven by the intolerance of minority groups. In the midst of the increasing number of protests by groups "disturbed" by the existence of houses of worship, discrimination in the form of sealing Christian religious groups' houses of worship continue to occur, which has included the churches of GKI Yasmin in Bogor, HKBP Filadelfia in Bekasi, and more recently in Tambora.

The increasing spate of repression and discrimination are more than isolated incidents, as they are symptoms of a deeper problem in the comprehension of the constitution and state-religion relations in a democratic Indonesia. Freedom and the right to worship are still restricted in the narrow sense; they are perceived as the rights belonging only to "official" religious groups. The foundation and definition of the "official" religious groups are in fact founded on a weak legal ground: one explanatory paragraph in the Blasphemy Law 1965 (PNPS Number 1 (1965)), which regulate the Defamation of Religion.

On the other hand, the understanding and recognition of the diversity among the religious community in Indonesia, in particular the differences within particular religions, is still a relatively unfamiliar and unacknowledged fact. In the macro context of religious life, majority-minority syndrome is still visible. Majority religious groups tend to think of having rights that are higher than the minorities. This trend is not exclusively a Muslim syndrome. In areas where the majority of the population are non-Muslim such as in East Nusa Tenggara, there are challenges to building mosques. Legal equality and social status among religious groups that are a minority is often overlooked.

More complicated is the recognition of diversity within religious groups. A religious understanding that comes from a minority sect is considered heretical. Minority sects such as Shia and Ahmadis have experienced discrimination in various areas. Although not much in the spotlight, there are potential issues within Christian communities as well with sects such as Jehovah witnesses and Mormons.

The main problem is not the “heretic branding” towards sects that differ from the mainstream religion. A difference of opinions and condemning a certain interpretation as “wrong or perverted” is a right that belongs to the religious sphere. However, the problem lies in the confusing intersection of the sphere of religion with the sphere of the state. The predicament comes up when religious groups expect to manipulate the state as a tool to limit and even eliminate religious minority groups. In this case, PNPS 1965 has been used as a legal basis to consider all matters outside the mainstream religion to potentially be called as an insult or blasphemy. The muddling between the authority of the state and religious authority to define its own orthodoxy has become part of the core problem. Addressing differences through civil ways within the religious sphere has been dragged into the legal arena. This in turn leads to society to act on their own when the expected legal prohibitions against sects were “too lax”. In a survey conducted by CSIS towards the end of 2012, the majority of respondents were still convinced that the state needs to intervene in limiting the freedom of religious groups that considered “deviant” and “illegitimate”. Differentiation of the state sphere and religious is still unclear to society as well as for government officials and the legal system.

Another related upheaval is the trend toward homogenization of religious views, rooted in the sensitive view of certain groups that consider actions taken against extremists as an act against the religion itself. The controversy escalated around the end of February when a video showing violence by the members of Detachment 88 against suspected terrorists circulated. Instantly, criticism towards Detachment 88's actions sprung from various parties, including from the current Muhammadiyah chairman, who in fact proposed the dissolution of Detachment 88.¹² Public outcry culminated, accusing violation of hu-

¹² “Muslim Groups Want Densus 88 Dissolved over Rights Abuses,” *The Jakarta Post*, 1 March 2013.

man rights. Demonstrations that demanded that Detachment 888 be disbanded were rampant, such as one that took place in front of the East Java Legislative Council.

Widespread condemnation and anger is quite a contrast with to the response to a similar video that emerged last year, showing torture of Papuans who were allegedly members of the Free Papua Movement (OPM). Condemnation of torture as a violation of human rights was voiced by groups of human rights activists, but the public outcry seemed much quieter than the case of Detachment 88 against terrorist groups.

It is rather ironic that many allegations arise that Detachment 88 violations of human rights are in fact anti-Islamic. While the violence of Detachment 88 cannot be approved, the allegations of those acts as being anti-Islamic bring forth a dangerous equation between terrorist groups and Islam.

Conclusion

The first quarter of 2013 has brought new developments to the political constellation of Indonesia. Political parties' shape, size and power will not be easily predicted in the coming year. The mapping of the presidential candidates, while possibly will still be filled with old faces, still has a lot of space for a fresh new face. The public frustration with old politicians may give chance to the rise of less established political figures.

On the other hand, corruption scandals tainting the government and political parties may not necessarily be simply bad news. It may also be positive signs of further inroad to clean up Indonesian politics.

On the development of civil society, in particular state-religion dynamics, challenges still persist. It is nevertheless a political process, but also societal process that may require time. Political parties and candidates running in 2014 will need to put this on their agenda. A survey to be conducted by CSIS in the second quarter of 2013 will further assess the newest developments of public opinion towards political parties and candidates. It will be an early gauge to see whether new names will appear as contenders in the upcoming election.