

The Internationalization of Internal Conflict and the Diplomatic Challenges: The Case of Papua

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PRESIDENT SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO (SBY) ended his 10 years of administration on 20 October, 2014. As to be expected, there were heated debates about his legacy in office. In an interview with *The Australian*, SBY claimed that at the end of his time in office, Indonesia had become a stronger nation, a stronger democracy and a stronger economy.¹ His point has validity. SBY succeeded in maintaining the country's political stability. During his presidency, communal violence declined, the 30 years conflict in Aceh ended, civil society substantially developed and there were not threats of potential military rebellion.

SBY has also succeeded in building a strong macro-economic management regime. Per capita income increased from US\$ 1184 in 2004 to US\$ 3490 in 2013; this is an increase of nearly 200 per cent. During 2009 to 2013, the country's average economic growth rate was 5.9 per cent. In the G20, Indonesia has the second highest growth after China.² In international affairs, SBY put Indonesia on the map of regional and global powers. ASEAN thrived under Indonesian leadership and the country was

1 Greg Sheridan, "A decade of development," *The Australian*, 26 August 2014

2 Ibid.

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also an active member in the G20.

Another hallmark of SBY term in office is his achievement in maintaining various levels of election process. A report described Indonesia as a model of democracy.³ Indonesia is seen as Southeast Asia's most democratic nation. This praise stems from the most competitive Legislative and Presidential election in Indonesian history held last April and July 2014 which had come to a dramatic and peaceful end.

However, despite such credits, SBY's presidency was also marred by shortcomings. Under his leadership there were high-levels of political corruption and pay-to-play arrangements; favoritism and collusion drove the decision-making process in the political, economic, and legal spheres.⁴ SBY also failed to manage religious minority issues. His economic "achievements" are also criticized due to their furthering of inequality and lack of job creation.

Ironically SBY also claimed that he has stabilized the situation in Papua. His policies on Papua as a matter of fact have faced limitations. Papua remains one of the poorer provinces in Indonesia and under his presidency violence and conflicts escalated. Human rights were also violated and disrespected. These issues served as fertile triggers for the internationalization of Papua. The Internationalization of Papua could be understood from two inter-linking points of view: (a) unresolved problems in Papua have raised the interest of other countries so that they voice their concern over the mishandling of Papua and place it under the international agenda; and (b) it is an 'active' movement by separatist or 'anti-integration' groups, who through various means act out in order to acquire sympathy and support from other countries towards their end goal, in the extreme sense opting for referendum or independence.

This groups may include Papua diaspora residing in various countries around the world which are normally also supported by foreign NGOs. Otto Ondawame, a Papua exile activist in Sydney argued that the diaspora and those struggling inside West Papua must work together to achieve independence. He further stated...? *both of them have to work together toward one goal, for simple reasons. People inside...know the political situation inside, but they don't know about the diplomatic [situation], what language they have to use, [or about]*

3 Joe Cochrane, "In Southeast Asia, Indonesia is an unlikely role model for democracy," *New York Times*, 5 September 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/world/asia/in-southeast-asia-indonesia-becomes-a-role-model-for-democracy.html?_r=0

4 Marcus Mietzner, "SBY's mixed legacy," *New Mandala*, 18 September 2014, <http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/09/18/sby-mixed-legacy/>

*international political relationships...*⁵

The effort to involve Papua diaspora is part of transnational campaign which can dramatically assist domestic civil movements, especially when the Indonesian government is stuck in denial and repression.⁶ Media and advanced communication technology played a crucial role in the internationalization of Papua. Finally, internationalization could also denote the aim to attract the United Nations to review the 'integration' of Papua into Indonesia by reviewing the historical Act of Free Choice in 1962. In the extreme sense, internationalization is 'international battle' to fight for Papua's rich natural resources.

Based on the above statement, there is no easy solution to solve the problem in Papua. SBY has definitely inherited the complexities of Papua from his predecessor. Papua remains 'the pebble in the shoe' for Indonesia's domestic affairs, which incongruously turned into a constant international issue. Such issues of internationalization not only capture the central government's failure to manage the complexities in Papua but also a sign of weak diplomatic strategies.

This article will observe cases of Papua internationalization and the diplomatic responses and challenges during SBY's administration. A discussion of SBY's policies for Papua and the 'trigger' of internationalization will be presented in the early section of this article.

SBY's Policies on Papua

During his 10 year presidency, especially during his second term in office, SBY laid out 5 standing positions of his administration on Papua which focus on approaches to welfare and equality:⁷

- 1) Strengthening the Homeland sovereignty while respecting the diversity and specificity of the people and territory of Papua;
- 2) Organizing and optimizing the implementation of Law No. 21/2001 regarding the Special Autonomy for Papua;

5 As cited in Camellia Webb-Gannon, "Culture as Strategy: Being West Papuan the Melanesian Way," in Peter King, Jim Elmslie and Camellia Webb-Gannon (Eds), *Comprehending West Papua* (Sydney: University of Sydney, 2011), p. 100.

6 Jason Macleod, "Pathways to Dialogue for Papua," in King, Elmslie and Webb-Gannon (Eds), *Comprehending West Papua*, pp. 71-74.

7 "Desain Kebijakan SBY untuk Papua," *Tempo.co*, 18 June 2012, <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/06/18/173411195/Desain-Kebijakan-SBY-untuk-Papua>

- 3) Perform affirmative action policies and promote recognition of the basic rights of the Papuan people, such as access to best quality higher education, careers in the bureaucracy and the military / police, and indigenous Papuans businessmen;
- 4) Design strategies, policies, and programs, including financing to accelerate regional development and empowerment of the people of Papua; and
- 5) Promoting respect for human rights and reduce violence, whether perpetrated by separatist groups in Papua or performed by state officers beyond the bounds of decency.

The Special Autonomy status (*Otonomi Khusus* – or *Otsus*) was enacted in 2001, and has since become the backbone policy to solve the complexity in Papua. Ironically the implementation of *Otsus* was full of shortcomings. Not only did it ‘fail’ to increase the welfare of the Papuans, the funds was also misused and corrupted. The State Financial Auditor (BPK) found Rp. 4,2 trillions had been corrupted. As a result of this disappointment, there were various symbolic movements led by activists to return the *Otsus* to the central government. SBY responded to this disappointment by calling for an audit of *Otsus* but the result was never publicly reported.

Approaching the end of his Presidential term, he announced the draft of *Otsus Plus* with the aim to rework or revision of Papua's *Otsus*. The revised *Otsus* gave additional emphasis to the issue of shared income in the field of fishery, energy, and mining. Until now the fate of this *Otsus Plus* is still unclear. The draft is currently still being discussed. This relates also to 'controversial' article 299 in the draft that regulates the possibility of holding referendum if progress fails to manifest in the *Otsus* implementation⁸. The public in Papua also remains skeptical of the good will of the government and its ability to enhance the development of Papua through *Otsus plus*, due to the shortcomings of the *Otsus*.

SBY also established the Papua People's Assembly (*Majelis Rakyat Papua* - MRP) through Government regulation (PP) No 54/2004. The MRP is expected to function as a vital organ for the implementation of the *Otsus*, especially as representative institution of indigenous Papuans. However, following its establishment the MRP operated without a clear role and function. This situation was seemingly rooted in the central governments excessive fear of that the MRP would support the struggle for independence of Papua. As a consequence, the MRP only had a limited

⁸ Papua Update: The Latest on *Otsus Plus*”, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Report No 7 (2014), pp. 1-11.

role such as formulating regulation of Special region (Perdatus) and Provincial Regulation (Perdasi). Due to such a limited role, the MRP was seen as only the collaboration of representatives of indigenous people⁹.

To support SBY's policies in Papua, in September 2011 he established the UP4B or The Unit to Accelerate Development in Papua and West Papua. Its mandate was to improve relations between the central government and Papuans. Its mission was also to get special autonomy back on track immediately. UP4B focus was on its development role, improving infrastructure, working on affirmative action policies, helping the indigenous Papuan business community and tailoring national laws to Papua realities¹⁰. The UP4B received little support from those that were skeptical of the Special Autonomy. Its success was also debatable at the end of its tenure.

SBY repeatedly coined his approach to Papua as equality, welfare and equity. During his first term SBY focused on a humane, wise and dialogic approach and he visited districts in Papua to have dialogues. In his second term in power, SBY enacted Presidential Regulation (PERPRES) No 65/2011 on the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (New Deal for Papua) that was followed by more fiscal decentralization. More new districts were also established despite their poor performance. The development agenda for Papua was also inserted in the National Middle Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2009-2014.

The Trigger of Internationalization

Despite SBY's above policies, the mishandling of the situation in Papua served as the trigger for its internationalization. There are four major issues: welfare issues, increasing violence and conflict, human rights issues and the debate on the Act of Free Choice. In regards to the welfare aspect, in March 2013, the poverty rate in Papua still stood at 31,1 per cent almost three times higher than the national figure of 11,37 per cent. Even though Special Autonomy funds have contributed relatively and positively to increasing the welfare of the Papuans; with Rp. 38 trillion that has been disbursed since 2002-2013, economic security is in reality still one of the most alarming problems in Papua. Food security and malnutrition also

9 Wawan Purwanto, *Papua in 100 Forthcoming Years* (Jakarta: CMB Press, 2012)

10 "Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua," International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 232 (2012), pp. 23-25

manifest in Papua.¹¹

In health aspects, Papua has the highest rate of maternal and infant mortality rate in Indonesia. The maternal mortality rate in Papua is 320/100.000 birth, as compared with national figure of 228/100.000 birth. Meanwhile, the infant mortality rate for Papua is 41/100.000 birth, as compared with the national figure of 34/100.000 birth.¹² The spread of HIV/AIDS is also alarming with 13,186 cases in September 2012.¹³

Secondly, on the conflict and violence aspect, conflicts both vertical and horizontal are escalating. International Crisis Group reported that Indonesian Papua has seen periodic clashes between pro-independence supporters and government forces. Exacerbating these conflicts are rising tensions between Muslim and Christian communities as exemplified in the cases of Manokwari and Kaimana province in 2007.¹⁴ These conflicts were triggered by economic inequality, discriminating policies and regulation and where religion finally became 'politics'.

However, most conflicts were clearly a sign of deep distrust and grievances between local communities and the central government. The security policy appears to be running exclusively against the government's desire to build trust, accelerate development and ensure that the Special autonomy law for Papua brought positive impacts¹⁵.

Conflict and violence intensified after the establishment of the West Papua National Committee (*Komite Nasional Papua Barat*) a pro-independence group from the central highlands that has close links with overseas supporters. Between 29 May and 14 June 2012 violence escalated in various areas in Papua including the capital of Jayapura where there were seven shootings of non-Papuaans including a German tourist. These attacks were claimed to be perpetrated by members of militant KNPB. The trigger of these attacks was the shooting of KNPB leader Mako Tabuni.

More violence occurred after the Third Papuan People's Congress on 17-19 October 2011 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the formation of the New Guinea Council. The first two days were peaceful. The third day was chaotic when hundreds of police arrested those involved in the congress claiming that they advocate for independence. Police began firing in the air and beating and kicking the participants. Three dead bodies were

11 "Gizi Buruk Landa Papua Barat", *Kompas*, 5 April 2013.

12 "Masih Tertinggi di Indonesia, Kematian Ibu dan Balita di Papua," *Liputan 6*, 1 April 2013, <http://health.liputan6.com/read/558806/masih-tertinggi-di-indonesia-kematian-ibu-dan-balita-di-papua>

13 "Gawat, Setiap tahun HIV/AIDS di Papua tambah 3.000 Kasus", *Bintang Papua*, 23 November, 2012.

14 "Communal Tensions in Papua," International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 154 (2008), pp. 1-24.

15 "Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua," pp. 15-19.

found with bullet holes¹⁶.

There were also a series on conflicts related to local elections (Pilkada). For example, the Ilaga conflict in Puncak Jaya district, which claimed 300 lives. Since then periodic violence including the targeting security officers and civilians occurred mostly in the highland of Puncak Jaya. Recent investigations find that members of the security force supplied ammunition to the separatist groups.

Thirdly, issues of human rights. This relates to the issues of torture and political detainees/prisoners. Amnesty International reported that 9 individuals were tortured and ill-treated by police or the military between May and November 2007; at least 6 of them died as a result of beatings, piercing with needles and shooting at close range. A video published online in October 2010 showed Papuans being kicked by men in uniform.¹⁷ President SBY claimed that these acts of violence were not instructions or even policy from high rank officials but were incidents.

The number of political detainees/prisoners in Papua continues to surge. In 2012, there were 26 political detainees/prisoners, while in 2013 49 more people were locked up. In total there are now 79 political detainees.¹⁸ Impunity lies at the heart of this human right issues. There is lack of effort to fully investigate and try before civilian courts police or military officials accused of human rights violation in Papua.¹⁹

Finally, the internationalization of Papua was also triggered a historic event that being the "Act of Free Choice" that was implemented in 1969, during which 1025 West Papuan leaders under the supervision of a strong military were selected to vote on behalf of the 809,327 West Papuans on the region's political status. The Act of Free Choice, which determined the 'fate' of Papua being 'integrated' with Indonesia, was regarded as full of manipulation. The Act of Free Choice was implemented in a way that was not honest because there was no ability to speak against Indonesia.²⁰ Pro referendum or pro-independence activists demand a review of the historic event during the Act of Free Choice.

16 Ibid, pp. 8-9.

17 Amnesty International, "Papua Digest" (2012), http://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/amnesty_international_papua_digest_29-01-2011.pdf, pp. 1-5.

18 "Papua Annual Review 2013," Report of the Papua Annual Review Event organized by the TIFA Foundation (2014), <http://www.tifafoundation.org/en/papua-annual-review-2013/>

19 Amnesty International, "Papua Digest," pp. 1-5.

20 Socrates Sofyan Yoman, "Injustice and Historical Falsehood: Integration of the Territory of Papua into Indonesia in 1969", in King, Elmslie and Webb-Gannon (Eds). *Comprehending West Papua*, pp. 116-128.

Papua Internationalization: The Latest Incidents

There were numerous incidents that gave way to the internationalization of the Papua conflict throughout the 10 years of SBY's administration. Below are some of the major incidents.

1. The Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney, Australia published a report in August 2005 assessing the treatment of Papuans by the TNI.²¹ This report attracted international attention.
2. 43 Papuan boat people landed in Australia seeking asylum in 2006, 42 were granted visa.
3. Video uploaded in YouTube on October 2010 showing the brutality of the Indonesian armed forces torturing Papuan civilians.
4. Cable 2769 US Embassy Jakarta to the Secretary of State (1 October 2007) cited a comment by Berty Fernandez, an Indonesian Foreign affairs workers arguing that the Indonesian military operated in Papua as 'virtually autonomous government entity. There were more troops in Papua than the military were willing to admit and that they were there to protect the military's interest in illegal logging²².
5. The violent breakup of the Papua People's Congress on 19 October 2011 coinciding as it did with a several months long strike at Freeport Gold and Cooper Mine and the killing of a Papuan Police Chief in the central highlands prompted US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton to urge the Indonesian government to open a dialogue to address the legitimate needs of the Papua people²³. Clinton criticized human rights violations. SBY defended the allegation through his spokesman Teuku Faizasyah, 'As far as the politics of Papua go, we've already made it clear that there are no systematic human rights violations in Papua. There are only isolated incidents, they are not the norm²⁴.
6. On February 17, 2005, Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, in correspondence with the Government of the United States wrote that in 1969,

21 John Wing and Peter King, "Genocide in West Papua? The role of the Indonesian state apparatus and a current needs assessment of the Papuan people," A report prepared for the West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, and ELSHAM Jayapura, Papua (2005).

22 Richard Chauvel, "Policy Failure and Political Impasse: Papua and Jakarta a Decade after the Papuan Spring", in King, Elmslie and Webb-Gannon (Eds), *Comprehending West Papua*, p. 115.

23 Ibid.

24 Cited in Peter King, "Self-Determination and Papua: The Indonesian Dimension", in King, Elmslie and Webb-Gannon (Eds), *Comprehending West Papua*, p. 151.

Indonesia set up an election that saw many brutal operations, known as Act of No Choice. Around 1025 West Papuan Leaders under the supervision of a strong military were selected to vote on behalf of the 809,327 West Papuans on the region's political status²⁵

7. On February 14 2008, Faleomavaega and Donald Payne, another member of the US Congress sent a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban-Ki-Koon arguing that the Referendum (1969) for native Papuans was never implemented. In fact, 37 members of the US Congress wrote letters in 2006 and requested the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to ask UN to carry out a review of the Act.²⁶
8. On December 1 2008, the British Parliament in London, the Hon. Andrew Smith, MP, the RT Rev. Lord Harries of Pentregarth, and 50 members of Parliament from various countries stated that they wanted the indigenous West Papuans to have self-determination because their future had been destroyed by the Act of Free Choice. In the United Nations, they appealed to other governments to provide Self-determination to Papua freely.²⁷
9. The International Parliaments for West Papua (IPWP) in the House of Commons in the UK was established in October 2008.²⁸
10. On December 1, 2009 the Houses of Parliament in London, the International Lawyers for West Papua (ILWP) stated that the Act of Free Choice had never been implemented, and cited two scandals: (a) the illegal Indonesian annexation of West Papua; and (2) international collusion with Indonesia.
11. Since 2008, Papuan exiles campaign against human right abuses, and promote a more active role for the West Papuan Media Alert. The reports from WPMA easily attracted international attention, especially from the international media.²⁹
12. Fourteen countries (the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Italy, German, Japan, Canada, South Korea, Mexico, Norway, France, Spain, New Zealand, and Switzerland) inquire about human rights violations in Papua in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in the UN Human Rights Assembly in Switzerland

25 Yoman, "Injustice and Historical Falsehood," p. 126.

26 Ibid, pp. 116-128.

27 Ibid, p. 127.

28 Ibid.

29 Nick Chesterfield, "Free the People? Free the Media ! Broadcasting Papuans Songs of Freedom", in King, Elmslie and Webb-Gannon (Eds), *Comprehending West Papua*, pp. 32-33.

- on May 23, 2012. Nine additional countries made the inquiries during this event than had during its predecessor in 2008.³⁰
13. The Free West Papua Campaign (FWPC) office was opened in Oxford, UK, by Benny Wenda. The Mayor of Oxford attended the opening ceremony on April 29, 2013.
 14. During a MSG submit meeting in Noumea, New Caledonia in June 2013, a motion in support of West Papuan Self-Determination was passed.
 15. In the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights, which met in January 2014 in Brussels, Belgium, concerns were raised about the human rights situation and limited access of foreign journalists and NGOs to Papua. Three activities, two of whom were Indonesian, were invited as guest speakers: Zely Ariane, from the Jakarta-based National Papua Solidarity (Napas), Victor Mambor, from the Jayapura chapter of the Alliance of Independent Journalist (AJI), and Norman Voss, from the German-based International Coalition for Papua (ICP).³¹
 16. An MSG delegation visited Jakarta and Papua in mid-January, 2014. The visit assessed an application by a West Papuan pro-independence group to join the MSG. Vanuatu finally boycotted the visit, claiming that the program had been 'hijacked' by the Indonesian government. Indonesia was accused of preventing the group from meeting with Indigenous West Papuans.
 17. Vanuatu's Prime Minister, Moana Carcasses Kalosil, spoke in front of United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva in March 2014. Kalosil supported the independence of Papua
 18. The Federal Republic West Papua (RFPB) opened its office in Dockland, Melbourne in June 2014.
 19. On August 5, 2014 two French journalists were arrested and detained for the misuse of their tourist visa, and for conducting journalistic activities. They were at first also accused of having close ties with the separatist movement, even though this was ultimately not proven. This incident attracted international attention and demands for their release.

The Melanesian Spear Group (MSG) has joined 'active players' countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and the Netherlands, in inquiries about the 'treatment' of the Indonesian

30 Freddy Numberi, "UE dan Pelanggaran HAM di Papua", *Kompas*, 7 May 2014

31 "In EU, activists tell of Papua abuses", *The Jakarta Post*, 25 January 2014.

government in Papua. The MSG is one of the three sub-regional groupings in the Pacific island region, which consists of Fiji, New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and the Front Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS), or a pro-independence movement from New Guinea. In 2013, the West Papua National Council for Liberation (WPNCL) applied for membership in the group, but no decision has been made.

Among MSG members, Vanuatu is one of the strongest defenders of Papua's interest, as can be seen through the speech by Vanuatu's PM made to the UN Human Rights Commission. This 'position' of Vanuatu on Papua caused 'discomfort' to other members, such as Fiji and PNG, which have more significant relationships with Indonesia. During the MSG visit to Jakarta and Papua in January 2014, member countries, with the exception of Vanuatu, made a joint statement supporting respective sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, and the principle of non-interference in each other internal affairs, as is consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

Other supporters of Papua internationally include West Papua Action based in Ireland, The Pacific Concerns Resource Centre (PCRC) based in Hawaii, the Association of West Papua in Australia, Cambridge Campaign and Peace (Campeace), West Papua Action Network (Westpan) based in Canada, Pan-African Coalition for the Liberation of West Papua (PACLWP), West Papua Association and Oxford Papua Right for Campaign based in the UK, West Papuan Women Association, Children of Papua, and the Foundation pro Papua based in the Netherlands.³²

SBY Foreign Policies and Diplomatic Challenges

The internationalization of the issue Papua's self-determination could be attributed to two factors: (a) continuous internal domestic 'failure' to promote welfare and human rights in Papua, and (b) 'diplomacy weaknesses.' Either way, as an 'actor' on the international stage, SBY positioned himself as an international statesman and foreign policy intellectual, showing himself to be keenly interested in foreign policy throughout his 10-year administration.³³

Unlike his predecessor, SBY transformed shifted responsibility for

32 Adriana Elisabeth, "Dimensi International Kasus Papua," *Jurnal Penelitian Politik: Papua Menggugat* Vol 3(1) (2006), pp. 52-58.

33 Aaron Connelly, "Indonesian Foreign Policy Under President Jokowi". Lowy Institute Analysis (2014), http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/indonesian-foreign-policy-under-president-jokowi_0.pdf

foreign policy away from the military and towards the foreign ministry and professional diplomats. In doing so, SBY 'transformed the sleepy foreign affairs unit in the State Palace into an engine of diplomatic engagement.' This unit was called the Presidential Staff for Foreign Affairs (SPHI), was led by Dino Patti Djalal, and functioned as an outpost of the foreign ministry in the Palace.³⁴ SBY's strategy of promoting greater civilian control over foreign policy, complemented by experiences gained during his military career, led him to be a well respected and highly experienced leader and foreign policy intellectual.

Despite such a drastic transformation of the foreign policy corps, SBY's foreign policy could also be classified as conventional and similar to his predecessors'. SBY considered Indonesia as a country with a 'thousand friends and zero enemies,' with an 'all directions foreign policies'. This approach to diplomacy prioritized the promotion of Indonesia's profile overseas ahead of progress on thorny issues in world affairs.³⁵ SBY also preferred soft power diplomacy, which allowed him to avoid hard choices. SBY was criticized by the bureaucracy and legislature for not taking a harder stance during various international disputes.

This policy stance could be seen as a short-coming of SBY's leadership, as he focused on building a 'good image' of Indonesia in front of international parties in one hand, but on the other hand undermined these efforts because of his stance on domestic issue such as that of Papua. With the growing internationalization of Papua, SBY's foreign policy of a thousand friends and zero enemies was clearly insufficient to tackle, or even curb, international condemnation of the issue.

Amidst the growing internationalization of Papua, diplomatic responses were passive and or reactive, rather than aggressive or strategic. This meant that there was no significant diplomatic response about the issue other than denying or rebutting any accusations concerning mistreatment in Papua. When, for example, Vanuatu's Prime Ministry Moana Carcasses spoke in front of the UN Human Rights Council, the Indonesian Ambassador to the UN, Triyono Wibowo simply rejected speech.

Similarly, when concerns were raised about the human rights situation and the limited access given to foreign journalists and NGOs in Papua at the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights in January 2014, Indonesia's Ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg and the European Union, Arif Havas Oegroseno, denied accusation that there were no

34 Ibid, pp. 2-4.

35 Ibid.

improvements of life condition in Papua.

Finally during the opening of the OPM office in Oxford, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, stating that the office's opening contradicted the friendly relationship between Indonesia and the United Kingdom. He then invited the British ambassador in Jakarta to explain and clarify his position on these events. Meanwhile, Coordinating Minister Djoko Suyanto confirms that the Indonesian Embassy in London similarly approached the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London.

Even though this activity was not supported by the British government, it demonstrated the 'dualism' of a country that, on one hand acknowledged Indonesia's sovereignty, but on the other hand put pressure on its handling on Papua. This 'double standard' concerning Papua and the Indonesian state is also a characteristic of other countries, such as the United States and Australia, and requires proper attention and response.

SBY's personal response towards international pressure on Papua is best summarized in his statement that "the government wishes to solve the issue in Papua in a peaceful, just and dignified manner by emphasizing dialogue and persuasive approach," and that "we decline foreign interference in settling this issue."³⁶ His statement is seemingly meaningless as far as diplomatic pressure is concerned. It is widely known that the situation in Papua has not improved and that the dialogue and persuasive approach that SBY mentioned lacks transparency. During his 10-year administration, SBY only visited Papua three times, which was clearly insufficient considering the complexity of Papua's problems.

More Strategic Diplomacy is Needed

Indonesia's diplomatic responses to international pressure concerning Papua were necessary, and fulfilled the minimum of what was required, although it was insufficient considering the magnitude of the internationalization of Papua's problems. In future, there needs to be a more strategic and comprehensive diplomatic strategy to 'curb-down' Papua's internationalization.

Firstly, Indonesia should more aggressively take advantage of its membership to various regional or multilateral organizations, such as ASEAN or APEC, and use its position there to explain its stance on the

36 As quoted in Bruce Vaughn, "Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics and the US Interest," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (2011), p. 19.

situation in Papua. Indonesia could further benefit from such forums as the European Parliament. In March 2014, the European Parliament ratified the Framework of Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation Partnership and Cooperation Between the Republic of Indonesia and the European Community and its Members States (PCA-RI-UE), which will regulate a comprehensive partnership between Indonesia and EU. Indonesia should take advantage of this forum and this agreement to discuss the issue of Papuan sovereignty.

Similarly, Indonesia should work with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), of which Indonesia has been a dialogue partner since 2001.³⁷ Such a forum could be used to diplomatically engage with other States in regards to the issue on Papua, especially given that a few members countries are constant observers of the situation there, and Indonesia's treatment of its population. We thus emphasize that Indonesia needs to act aggressively to benefit from these forums before they can be 'hijacked' by Papuan separatist interest.

Secondly, working with an experienced international mediator could potentially help sort out the complexity of the issues facing Papua and also assuage the international pressure. This mediator could be a country or organization. For example, New Zealand would be an interesting candidate given that it has experience as a negotiator from working as a peace broker in Bougainville.³⁸ This option, however, is made more difficult by Indonesia's and New Zealand's 'respect of sovereignty.' Therefore, more agreement between both countries would have to be reached before such an alternative could take place.

Thirdly, diplomatic strategies must involve Papuan diasporas leaders living abroad in formal diplomatic engagement. These Papuan diasporas are usually stigmatized and seen as extensions of the 'separatist' movements in exile. There needs to be a change of mindset that would allow these diasporas to be seen as agent of peace who could tame the pressure of Papua's internationalization.

Fourthly, 'the ambassador forum' in Jakarta needs to be geared more actively to serve the interest of the Indonesian government and to give clarification on the situation in Papua to other country representatives.

37 PIF was established in 1971, and was originally named South Pacific Forum (SPF). The members consist of 16 countries: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Besides having permanent members, PIF also have two associate members (New Caledonia and French Polynesia) and 13 dialogue partners.

38 Maire Leadbeater, "New Zealand as a Potential West Papuan Peace Broker: Learning from Bougainville", in King, Elmslie and Webb-Gannon (Eds), *Comprehending West Papua*, pp. 159-176.

Fifthly, diplomatic state visit to countries that are paying attention to the situation in Papua should occur more often. Countries under the MSG, for example, are countries to whom Indonesia needs to pay closer attention when considering their strategic role in the Papuan issue. SBY made a positive move by visiting Fiji in June 2014, and using the visit to explain his policies on Papua to Pacific Island Leaders, many of whom had been critical of Jakarta's handling of the issue. SBY was the first President to visit the Pacific Islands since Indonesia's independence. SBY's visit could be used as a starting point to pursue further diplomatic ties with countries under the MSG. SBY's initiative to invite MSG officials to Papua and Jakarta in order to receive briefings on developments in Papua can be seen as a move to increase international support for the country's sovereignty. This initiative is positive as far as diplomatic strategies are concerned, and needs to be sustained in future.

Concluding Notes

Effort to tame or even minimize the pressure made by the internationalization of the issues in Papua should be rooted in efforts to deal with Papua's internal complexity. The three major problems facing Papua are the need to increase the welfare of indigenous Papuans, the need to uphold human rights, and the need to resolve the ongoing conflict there. Furthermore, there must be a more 'aggressive' and comprehensive diplomatic strategy for how to deal with the internationalization of Papua – a few options of which were explained above. Despite the limitation of his actions, SBY should be given credit for his efforts to solve the problems in Papua.

Meanwhile, the new government under President Joko Widodo needs to promote good will and that seriously the need to make a breakthrough in solving the complex issues surrounding Papua. It cannot see the issue as business as usual. Such a failure to manage Papua would only sustain the internationalization of the Papuan issue.